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SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS
David H. Webber
ABSTRACT—Individual investors victimized by securities fraud have no
voice in directing class actions brought on their behalf once institutional
investors obtain lead plaintiff appointments. The same holds for state-level
transactional class actions claiming breaches of fiduciary duty by boards of
directors in connection with mergers and acquisitions. In theory, the
interests of institutional and individual investors align, nullifying the need
for a separate voice for individuals; one rationale for the lead plaintiff
modifications of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 was
that individuals would benefit from the sophistication of institutional
investor lead plaintiffs. But in practice, individual investors’ interests in
these actions often differ from, and may directly conflict with, those of
institutional lead plaintiffs. The routine appointment of institutional lead
plaintiffs without regard to these conflicts effectively elevates the interests
of institutional over individual investors, running afoul of procedural
requirements that lead plaintiffs be typical and adequate class
representatives. This Article examines the recurrent conflicts between these
two groups of investors and suggests that the best remedy is for courts to
appoint representative individual investors as co-lead plaintiffs with
institutional investors. This Article proposes a procedure for selecting such
individual co-lead plaintiffs from the pool of sophisticated individuals who
are likely to be class members.
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INTRODUCTION
Individual investors victimized by securities fraud have no voice in
directing class actions brought on their behalf once institutional investors
obtain lead plaintiff appointments. The same holds for state-level
transactional class actions claiming breaches of fiduciary duty by boards of
directors in connection with mergers and acquisitions. Advocates for the
status quo, and those who see no reason to change it, justify this
marginalization of individual investors by institutional ones in three ways.
First, institutional and individual investors share the same deterrent and
compensatory interests in class actions; therefore, in representing their own
interests, institutional investors represent those of individuals too. Second,
the superior legal and financial acumen of institutional investors makes
them more motivated and sophisticated monitors of class counsel than
individual investors.1 Third, individual investors are “at best uninformed, at
1

See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 266, 273–74 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he goal of the
Reform Act’s lead plaintiff provision is to locate a person or entity whose sophistication and interest in
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worst fools,”2 whose interests are best looked after by institutions.3 In this
Article, I challenge all three of these assertions. I argue that institutional and
individual investors do not always share the same interests in litigation, that
individual investors can be highly motivated lead plaintiffs, and that there is
substantial evidence in the finance literature suggesting that at least a subset
of such investors are sophisticated and consistently outperform institutions.4
This is not to deny the fact that institutional investors have brought
numerous benefits to federal securities class actions since passage of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) in 1995. Such benefits
include decreasing the probability of a case being dismissed, increasing
monetary recoveries, and improving the independence of boards at
defendant companies.5 Some of these benefits have carried over to statelevel transactional cases since Delaware imported the PSLRA’s preference
for institutional investor lead plaintiffs into its law.6 For example, in a
separate empirical project, I found that institutional lead plaintiffs challenge
poorer quality deals than do individual investors and that some institutional
lead plaintiffs—notably public pension funds—correlate with improved
outcomes for shareholders.7 Without ignoring those benefits, this Article
argues that troubling conflicts of interest between institutional and
the litigation are sufficient to permit that person or entity to function as an active agent for the
class . . . .” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 32 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 731 and S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 10 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 689); Elliott J.
Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can
Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2126 (1995) (“Those investors
have the knowledge and financial sophistication necessary to serve as effective litigation monitors. Their
stake in the outcome of class actions would give them an incentive to do that job well.”).
2
Joshua D. Coval, David A. Hirshleifer & Tyler Shumway, Can Individual Investors Beat the
Market? 6 (Harvard Univ. Sch. of Fin., Working Paper No. 04-025, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=364000.
3
See S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 11 & n.34 (noting that settlements negotiated under the supervision of
institutional plaintiffs will be more “fair and reasonable” than other settlements (quoting Weiss &
Beckerman, supra note 1, at 2105)).
4
See discussion infra Part III.
5
E.g., C.S. Agnes Cheng et al., Institutional Monitoring Through Shareholder Litigation, 95 J. FIN.
ECON. 356, 380–81 (2009); James D. Cox et al., Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of
Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1636–39 (2006) (finding that
institutional investors “increase settlements by 0.04% for every 1% increase in Provable Losses”);
Michael A. Perino, Institutional Activism Through Litigation: An Empirical Analysis of Public Pension
Fund Participation in Securities Class Actions 24, 30–31 (St. John’s Univ. Sch. of Law, Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 06-0055, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=938722 (finding that cases
with public-pension-fund lead plaintiffs settle for greater amounts than cases with individual lead
plaintiffs).
6
E.g., TCW Tech. Ltd. P’ship v. Intermedia Commc’ns, Inc., No. 18336, 2000 WL 1654504, at *4
(Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2000) (establishing standard for selection of lead plaintiffs favoring institutional
investors similar to PSLRA).
7
David H. Webber, Private Policing of Mergers and Acquisitions: An Empirical Assessment of
Institutional Lead Plaintiffs in Transactional Litigation 22–24, 34–36 (July 5, 2011) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1879647.
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individual investors strongly suggest that institutions are often not typical
and adequate representatives for the shareholder class as they are required
to be by the PSLRA, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (Rule 23), and
Rule 23’s state-law equivalents.8 As discussed below, the typicality and
adequacy of lead plaintiffs is crucial to the legitimacy of class actions,
justifying adjudication of the rights of absent parties by assuring that these
parties’ interests have been adequately represented by lead plaintiffs who
share them.9
In the sixteen years since passage of the PSLRA, several conflicts have
emerged between institutional and individual investors. Institutions’
frequent use of derivatives trading, their inability to sell their substantial
stakes in the defendant even after a fraud is revealed for fear of further
harming the share price,10 their implicit willingness to exchange monetary
compensation for corporate governance reform,11 and, in the transactional
context, their occasional ownership of both target and bidder companies
give them litigation incentives that at times clash with those of individual
investors. In practice, as will be shown below, courts have disregarded
these conflicts in continuing to appoint institutional lead plaintiffs. This
typicality and adequacy problem is compounded by the fact that courts
scarcely address it when selecting a lead plaintiff, instead reserving the
inquiry for the class certification stage, by which time the case may already
have been settled by the potentially atypical and inadequate class
representative.12 Addressing the problem at this later stage increases costs to
the class, either by imposing a new lead plaintiff in midstream and
jeopardizing a settlement or, more likely, by not imposing a new lead
plaintiff and accepting a settlement negotiated by a party of questionable
representativeness.
By elucidating these clashes, this Article makes an early contribution
to the emerging literature on shareholder conflicts with other minority
8

15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb) (2006); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3)–(4); see, e.g., MD. R. CIV.
P. 2-231; MASS. R. CIV. P. 23.
9
See discussion infra Part III.A (discussing Rule 23’s typicality and adequacy requirements); see
also SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 80–83 (Found. Press 2d ed. 2008) (discussing Rule 23’s
requirement of adequacy of representation in class action lawsuits).
10
See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 244 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[A]n institutional
investor with enormous stakes in a company is highly unlikely to divest all of its holdings in that
company, even after a securities class action is filed in which it is a class member.”); In re Royal
Dutch/Shell Transp. Sec. Litig., 404 F. Supp. 2d 605, 611 (D.N.J. 2005) (“[B]ecause of the very size of
an institutional investor’s shareholdings, an institutional investor might be discouraged from divesting
itself of the stock.”).
11
See, e.g., Cendant, 264 F.3d at 219, 246–47 (noting objector’s grievance that the lead plaintiff
negotiated a settlement including corporate governance changes that would only benefit class members
that continued to hold Cendant stock after revelation of the fraud).
12
See, e.g., The PSLRA and Securities Class Actions, BOLOGNESE-LAW.COM, http://www.
bolognese-law.com/PSLRA_and_Securities.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2012) (noting the existence of
“pre-certification settlement negotiations” by lead plaintiffs).
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shareholders,13 diverging from corporate and securities law’s traditional
preoccupation with conflicts between minority and majority shareholders or
between shareholders and management.14 In an age of increasing
shareholder democracy, such conflicts will proliferate and intensify. This
Article breaks new ground by addressing these conflicts in the context of
securities class actions.15
While the primary purpose of this Article is to address this typicality
and adequacy problem, it also presents an opportunity to focus on a related
issue in the selection of lead plaintiffs: the potential motivation gap between
individual and institutional investors. The PSLRA makes whoever has the
largest absolute financial interest in the fraud the presumptive lead plaintiff
among applicants for the position.16 The purpose of this provision is to favor
selection of institutional investors who, because of their larger assets, are
more widely and deeply invested in the markets and therefore are more
likely to be exposed to fraud and to have the largest losses when they are so
exposed.17 Yet, the large absolute losses that qualify institutions for lead
plaintiff appointments are frequently trivial relative to their overall assets.18
In contrast, comparatively small losses incurred by individuals may
constitute a far higher percentage of the individuals’ assets, rendering the
loss far more material to them than to institutions.19 The high materiality of
13

See, e.g., Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden
(Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 828–30 (2006) (discussing investors’ use of empty
voting to advance their own interests at the expense of fellow shareholders); Iman Anabtawi, Some
Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power (U.C.L.A. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series,
Research Paper No. 05-16, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=783044 (discussing several types
of conflicts between shareholders).
14
See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN.
737, 739 (1997) (noting the importance of management, large shareholders, and individual shareholders
to corporate governance).
15
For simplicity, I use “securities class actions” to mean securities fraud class actions and statelevel transactional class actions.
16
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb) (2006).
17
H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 34 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 733
(noting that Congress “intend[ed] that the lead plaintiff provision will encourage institutional investors
to take a more active role in securities class action lawsuits”); S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 11 (1995),
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690 (“The Committee intends to increase the likelihood that
institutional investors will serve as lead plaintiffs by requiring the court to presume that the member of
the purported class with the largest financial stake in the relief sought is the ‘most adequate plaintiff.’”).
18
See, e.g., Armour v. Network Assocs., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1053 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (“If a
prospective lead plaintiff shows it suffered the largest financial loss, that class member has sufficiently
satisfied the second requirement of the lead plaintiff presumption, regardless of how that amount
compares with the total damages in the case or the prospective lead plaintiff’s total assets.”).
19
See e.g., In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6027-VCL, 2010 WL 5550677, at
*6–7 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2010) (assessing lead plaintiff applicants’ economic stakes in the lawsuit
relative to their overall portfolios and expressing concern about the “rational apathy” of lead plaintiff
applicants with large absolute stakes in the case, but for whom those stakes represent a negligible
portion of their portfolios).
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these losses may make an individual investor monitor class counsel more
zealously than an institution.20 Moreover, institutions incur agency costs
that individual investors do not, partially inhibiting optimal monitoring.21
This Article asserts that in addition to improving the typicality and
adequacy of the lead plaintiff group, its proposed solution—the
appointment of individual and institutional co-lead plaintiffs—has the
potential to improve the motivation and sophistication of the group as well.
Appointment of qualified individuals as co-lead plaintiffs22 with
institutional investors offers a relatively undisruptive remedy to the
typicality and adequacy problem. Utilizing a procedure that mirrors the
current process of identifying the investor with the largest financial interest
in the litigation, courts can assure selection of individual co-lead plaintiffs
who are both sophisticated and highly motivated. Contrary to the caricature
of individual investors as unsophisticated dupes,23 a survey of the recent
financial literature provides evidence that there are a substantial number of
individual investors who are at least as sophisticated and arguably more
motivated to serve as lead plaintiffs than institutional investors.24 Such colead plaintiff individual investors would be screened for the conflicts
described below and would owe the same fiduciary duties to the class that
the institutional investor lead plaintiff does,25 while serving as more natural
advocates for individual investor class members and more motivated
representatives for the class as a whole.
This Article argues that this solution not only ameliorates the typicality
and adequacy problems but causes little disruption to the established
rhythms of securities class action practice, allowing courts to continue
deferring their “searching inquiry” from the lead plaintiff appointment stage
to the class certification stage.26 It will improve the overall motivation of
the lead plaintiffs to maximize recovery for the class. It is calibrated to
reduce conflicts without driving away institutional investor lead plaintiff
20

See discussion infra Part I.C.1.
See, e.g., Kasper Meisner Nielsen, Institutional Investors and Private Equity, 12 REV. FIN. 185,
190–91 (2007) (discussing agency costs incurred by institutional investors when monitoring private
equity).
22
Throughout this Article, I use the term “co-lead plaintiff” when courts name more than one party
as lead plaintiff.
23
See Coval, Hirshleifer & Shumway, supra note 2, at 6.
24
See discussion infra Part III.
25
See generally In re Milestone Scientific Sec. Litig., 187 F.R.D. 165, 176 (D.N.J. 1999) (stating
that any lead plaintiff has significant duties).
26
See e.g., In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., No. 07-2257, 2008 WL
820922, at *26 (1st Cir. Mar. 28, 2008) (“[W]hen a Rule 23 requirement relies on a novel or complex
theory as to injury, . . . the district court must engage in a searching inquiry into the viability of that
theory and the existence of the facts necessary for the theory to succeed.”); see also Seth H. Yeager, In
re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litigation: Examining the Requisite Levels of Inquiry
into the Merits of a Case at the Class Certification Stage, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 563, 566–68 (2009)
(noting that, when appropriate, courts conduct a searching inquiry at the class certification stage).
21
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applicants. While it is true that institutional lead plaintiffs would have to
adjust to operating with an individual co-lead plaintiff, this Article argues
that the advantages of an individual co-lead outweigh the disadvantages,
even from the institutional perspective. For example, individual co-lead
plaintiffs will help insulate the settlement from individual investor objectors
who appear at the settlement hearing to confront the court with the conflicts
addressed in this Article.27 This improved insulation results from the
enhanced procedural protections for individual investors offered by the colead plaintiff structure, cohering with a primary objective of the securities
laws28 without inhibiting market integrity and efficiency.
An individual co-lead plaintiff can also help blunt defense arguments
that the institutions have not been seriously harmed by the purported fraud
and are instead engaging in political grandstanding, taking legal action for
nonpecuniary reasons, or simply fronting for lawyers seeking to maximize
their own compensation. As trial lawyers like to say, individuals will put a
“human face” on the fraud.29 Participation by individual investors at
mediation sessions, settlement conferences, or court hearings will better
reflect the actual costs of securities fraud, shifting these negotiations from
confrontations between financial behemoths into confrontations between
financial behemoths plus individuals devastated by the fraud. Institutional
plaintiffs may also benefit from this dynamic. Under this Article’s proposal,
the individual co-lead plaintiff would have been screened and selected by
the court and would be an official member of the lead plaintiff group. He or
she would be treated differently than most individual investors who may
appear at such events, with or without lawyers. Such individuals are
perceived to be annoying interlopers,30 sometimes unfairly and sometimes
not. Institutions can hardly complain if qualified and credible individual
lead plaintiffs help push their settlements towards higher monetary
compensation and more effective deterrence.
Finally, the co-lead plaintiff approach is superior to both the status quo
and the more extreme remedy of dividing individual and institutional
investors into subclasses, a cure that may be more harmful than the disease.
Subclasses may be necessary in extreme cases in order to remedy
otherwise-insoluble conflicts, safeguard the interests of individual investors,
and preserve their bargaining power with class counsel, institutional co-lead

27

See discussion infra Part III.B.
141 CONG. REC. 35, 273–76 (1995) (statement of Sen. Pete Domenici) (stating the ways in which
the PSLRA protects individual investors).
29
See, e.g., Thomas G. Shapiro, Trial of a Securities Class Action (ALI-ABA Course of Study, June
17, 1994), WL C938 ALI-ABA 205, 208 (“From a strategic point of view, trial counsel may want to put
a human face on the victims of the fraud, particularly if they are sympathetic.”).
30
See, e.g., C. Edward Fletcher, III, Sophisticated Investors Under the Federal Securities Laws,
1988 DUKE L.J. 1081, 1137 (noting the disparate treatment of sophisticated and unsophisticated
investors in securities class action suits).
28
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plaintiffs, and defendants.31 But because subclasses run afoul of Congress’s
intent that institutional investors be appointed lead plaintiffs, deprive
individual investors of the sophistication of such institutional lead plaintiffs,
and expose the subclasses to divide-and-conquer strategies by defendants,
this Article concludes that the optimal solution to these intraclass conflicts
is appointment of individual and institutional co-lead plaintiffs. Courts
should only create subclasses as a last resort, preferably on motion from a
co-lead plaintiff, not sua sponte to avoid unnecessary work for
overburdened courts.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I tracks the preference for
institutional investor lead plaintiffs at both the federal and state levels. Part
II surveys the recent finance literature on individual investors, suggesting
that individual investors are not per se unsophisticated, as is commonly
believed, and could be highly qualified monitors of class counsel, if
selected skillfully. Part III explores the ways in which the interests of
individual and institutional investors may be misaligned, including conflicts
over derivatives trading and corporate governance reform, conflicts
between selling and holding shareholders, and conflicts created by
institutional ownership of both target and bidder companies in mergers and
acquisitions. Part IV assesses possible solutions to these conflicts, including
the use of subclasses, and ultimately concludes that the optimal solution is
appointment of a sophisticated and motivated individual investor as a colead plaintiff with an institutional investor, reserving the creation of
subclasses for extreme cases and preferably on motion from the individual
co-lead plaintiff. Part IV also outlines the simple procedure by which such
an individual lead plaintiff could be selected. A brief conclusion follows.
I.

FEDERAL AND STATE LAW’S PREFERENCE FOR INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR LEAD PLAINTIFFS IN SECURITIES AND
TRANSACTIONAL CLASS ACTIONS

A. The PSLRA Creates a Preference for Institutional Investor Lead
Plaintiffs in Federal Securities Class Actions
The PSLRA introduced a practice of favoring institutional investor
lead plaintiffs in securities class actions.32 In part, the purpose of this new
practice was to remedy the high agency costs of class action plaintiffs’
lawyers. Prior to the PSLRA, lead-plaintiff appointments for securities class
actions were awarded to whichever plaintiff filed the first lawsuit.33
31

See discussion infra Part IV.B.
S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 11 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690 (“The Committee
believes that increasing the role of institutional investors in class actions will ultimately benefit the class
and assist the courts.”).
33
Id. at 11 (“Courts traditionally appoint the lead plaintiff and lead counsel in class action lawsuits
on a ‘first come, first serve’ basis.”).
32
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Congress found that as a result of this race to the courthouse, plaintiffs’ law
firms maintained stables of “professional plaintiffs”—individual investors
with very small financial stakes in a broad array of companies, as opposed
to the individuals with concentrated losses proposed as co-lead plaintiffs in
this Article.34 When a stock fraud was revealed at one of these companies,
the lawyers would quickly sue on behalf of one of their professional
plaintiffs.35 Such lead plaintiffs, with their minimal financial interest in the
outcome of the case, had little incentive to actively monitor class counsel,
allowing counsel to act primarily in its own interests rather than in those of
the class, thus increasing agency costs for the class.36
Congress believed that these agency costs could be reduced if the lead
plaintiff had a large enough stake in the outcome to be incentivized to
monitor class counsel and if the lead plaintiff were sufficiently
sophisticated to act skillfully on its incentive.37 Hence the PSLRA’s lead
plaintiff provision creates a presumption that
the most adequate plaintiff in any private action arising under this chapter is
the person or group of persons that . . . in the determination of the court, has
the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class; and . . . otherwise
satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.38

This presumption may be rebutted “only upon proof by a member of the
purported plaintiff class that the presumptively most adequate
plaintiff . . . will not fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class;
or . . . is subject to unique defenses that render such plaintiff incapable of
adequately representing the class.”39 In adopting these provisions, Congress
endeavored “to increase the likelihood that institutional investors will serve
as lead plaintiffs.”40 Inspired by an argument originated by Elliott Weiss and
John Beckerman in their article, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How
Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class
Actions, Congress concluded that “[i]nstitutions with large stakes in class
actions have much the same interests as the plaintiff class generally; thus,

34

See id. at 9 (describing professional plaintiffs).
Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 1, at 2060–61 (stating that “the usual pattern is for a lawyer who
specializes in representing plaintiffs to take the initiative,” and “plaintiffs’ attorneys recruit most of the
investors in whose names they initiate class actions”).
36
Cf. id. at 2056, 2061 & n.35 (noting that institutional investors have large stakes in most class
actions and are well situated to monitor the conduct of plaintiffs’ attorneys).
37
S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 11 (intending to increase the likelihood that institutional investors be
chosen as lead plaintiff); see also Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 1, at 2105 (“Further, because the
named plaintiff or group of plaintiffs with the largest financial stake in the outcome of an action has the
greatest economic incentive to monitor class counsel’s performance effectively, courts should adopt a
presumption that that plaintiff or group will ‘most adequately’ represent class members’ interests.”).
38
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I) (2006) (emphasis added).
39
Id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)–(II).
40
S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 11.
35
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courts could be more confident settlements negotiated under the supervision
of institutional plaintiffs were ‘fair and reasonable’ than is the case with
settlements negotiated by unsupervised plaintiffs’ attorneys.”41 This strong
language provides the federal courts with a mandate to place institutional
plaintiffs at the head of class actions.
Rule 23 of the Rules of the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware
tracks the language of its federal counterpart and similarly requires
typicality and adequacy in a lead plaintiff.42 Subsequent to the PSLRA,
Delaware courts adopted a similar requirement regarding the lead plaintiff’s
financial stakes in securities class actions, with one critical difference.
Delaware courts weigh the “relative economic stakes” of competing lead
plaintiff movants in the outcome of the lawsuit,43 which suggests the
possibility that the lead plaintiff that has the most at stake relative to its own
assets, and not on an absolute scale, could be appointed lead plaintiff.44
Below, I will discuss this possibility further.
As Congress intended, federal courts have since interpreted the
PSLRA’s “largest financial interest” clause to mean the largest absolute
loss.45 Thus, whichever individual or entity incurs the largest loss and
moves for the position becomes the presumptive lead plaintiff. As
predicted, institutional investors now lead over 40% of securities fraud class
actions46 and around 40% of transactional class actions in Delaware.47

41

See id. (quoting Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 1, at 2105) (internal quotation marks omitted).
DEL. CH. CT. R. 23(a)(3)–(4), available at http://courts.delaware.gov/forms/download.aspx?
id=39138.
43
Hirt v. U.S. Timberlands Serv. Co., No. CIV.A. 19575, 2002 WL1558342, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 3,
2002) (citing TCW Tech. Ltd. P’ship v. Intermedia Commc’ns, Inc., No. 18336, 2000 WL 1654504, at
*4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2000) and according “the relative economic stakes” of the competing litigants
great weight); see also Dutiel v. Tween Brands, Inc., No. 4743-CC, 2009 WL 3494626, at *3 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 28, 2009) (“[T]he motivating force behind the rulings in TCW Tech., Hirt, and Wiehl [discussing
‘relative economic stakes’] is . . . the significance of an individual’s stake in the litigation and the
resulting incentive the individual has to participate in the litigation and monitor his or her counsel.”).
44
See Dutiel, 2009 WL 3494626, at *3 (critiquing view of “relative economic stakes” language as
calling for comparison of lead plaintiff applicants’ stakes relative to each other). This opinion is silent
about the notion that relative economic stakes could refer to the applicants’ stakes in the case relative to
their overall portfolios or assets, but favorably cites language in Wiehl v. Eon Labs, No. Civ.A. 1116-N,
2005 WL 696764, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 22, 2005) that is supportive of this view. See infra note 82.
45
See, e.g., Armour v. Network Assocs., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1053 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (“If a
prospective lead plaintiff shows it suffered the largest financial loss, that class member has sufficiently
satisfied the second requirement of the lead plaintiff presumption, regardless of how that amount
compares with the total damages in the case or the prospective lead plaintiff’s total assets.”).
46
See, e.g., 2003 Securities Litigation Study, PWC SEC. LITIG. STUDY (PriceWaterhouseCoopers
LLP, New York, N.Y.), 2004, at 6, available at http://10b5.pwc.com/pdf/2003_study_final.pdf (“In
2002 institutional investors and public investment or pension funds comprised 51 percent of the lead
plaintiffs for all cases filed. In 2003 these major investors represented 42 percent of the lead plaintiffs in
cases filed.”).
42
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Overall, the use of institutional investors as lead plaintiffs correlates with
better outcomes for shareholders in securities class actions, although it
remains disputed whether this is because they are better lead plaintiffs or
because they cherry-pick the best cases.48
As a practical matter, many institutions interested in obtaining lead
plaintiff appointments enter into portfolio-monitoring arrangements with
plaintiffs’ law firms.49 The law firms directly access the investment
portfolios of the institutions.50 In many instances, the law firms will
discover a potential fraud or a suspiciously unattractive deal and notify
institutions with significant exposure that they may qualify for lead plaintiff
status.51 Once notified of the fraud or suspicious transaction, institutions
typically issue a request for proposals to the firms monitoring their
portfolios.52 The proposals state the law firms’ assessments of the strengths
and weaknesses of the case, argue that the fund should or should not pursue
it, and, of course, if the fund does pursue it, why it should select that firm as
lead counsel.53 Portfolio monitoring is a likely explanation for the fact that
institutional investors obtain lower attorneys’ fees for the class.54 The
institutions are ideally situated to force the firms to compete with one
another, particularly on price.55
47

This statistic is based on a dataset I have collected and analyzed as part of a forthcoming
empirical project on institutional investors as lead plaintiffs in Delaware class actions. Webber, supra
note 7, at 7.
48
See Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, On Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence on the Developing
Role of Public Pension Funds in Corporate Governance, 61 VAND. L. REV. 315, 341 (2008) (stating that
“studies cannot determine the frequency with which funds participate actively,” and thus, “it is possible
that . . . funds simply cherry pick the stronger securities suits”).
49
William B. Rubenstein, What We Now Know About How Lead Plaintiffs Select Lead Counsel
(And Hence Who Gets Attorneys Fees!) in Securities Cases, 3 CLASS ACTION ATT’Y FEE DIG. 219, 220
(2009).
50
See, e.g., Portfolio Monitoring Service, MOTLEY RICE, http://www.motleyrice.com/securitiesand-consumer-fraud/portfolio-monitoring-service (last visited Mar. 24, 2012) (advertising portfolio
monitoring services).
51
Id. at 219–20.
52
See id. (stating that funds typically have a securities firm monitor their investments for
irregularities); see also Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 572 Pension Fund v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. C 0120418 JW, 2004 WL 5326262, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2004) (“Nothing about these [monitoring
agreements] renders Carpenters inadequate as a class representative.”).
53
See Rubenstein, supra note 49, at 219 (describing requests for proposals).
54
See id. at 220 (discussing Iron Workers Local No. 25 Pension Fund v. Credit-Based Asset
Servicing & Securitization, LLC, 616 F. Supp. 2d. 461, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding MissPERS’s
arrangement with twelve monitoring law firms to be permissible because of MissPERS’s ability to play
each firm off the other to lower fees)); see also Michael A. Perino, Institutional Activism Through
Litigation: An Empirical Analysis of Public Pension Fund Participation in Securities Class Actions 25,
30–31 (St. John’s Legal Studies Research, Working Paper No. 06-0055, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=938722 (finding that the size of attorney fee requests and awards negatively
correlate with public pension lead plaintiffs in securities class actions).
55
See Rubenstein, supra note 49, at 220.
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Despite these benefits to all plaintiffs, portfolio monitoring may also
reflect a passive approach to the lead plaintiff role. The mere existence of
the practice is indicative of a simple fact: even the large absolute losses that
qualify institutions for lead plaintiff appointments may still be too small for
the institutions to notice them without assistance. This will rarely, if ever,
be true for the individuals proposed here as co-lead plaintiffs. It is one
illustration of why the use of individual investors who suffer lower absolute
losses but higher losses relative to their total assets may be a superior means
of achieving Congress’s objective: improving the lead plaintiff’s motivation
to monitor class counsel.56
Concern for individual investors coheres well with both traditional and
more contemporary justifications for securities regulation and for private
securities class actions specifically. The protection of individual investors
has always been a core mission of securities regulation,57 and recent
research suggests that individual investors serve the market by improving
share price accuracy.58 Traditionally, the purpose of private securities class
actions has been to deter fraud and to compensate shareholders.59 In the past
decade, academics and policymakers have debated vigorously whether such
litigation in its current form successfully accomplishes either objective. The
primary criticism of securities class actions is the purported “circularity
problem.”60 Like most civil litigation, securities class actions are almost
always either dismissed or settled.61 These actions settle through payments
made either directly by the issuer, by the issuer’s directors and officers’
liability insurers, or occasionally by underwriters and professionals (and
their insurers).62 In effect, the portion of the settlement paid by the issuer

56

Individuals’ motivation and the phenomenon of portfolio monitoring are discussed further below
in Part I.C.1.
57
See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. 35,291 (1995) (statement of Sen. Carol Moseley-Braun) (stating that
the PSLRA “was designed to maintain strong investor protection”).
58
Alicia J. Davis, Do Individual Investors Affect Share Price Accuracy? Some Preliminary
Evidence 1 (Univ. Mich. Empirical Legal Studies Ctr., Working Paper No. 07-018, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=998093 (“[C]ontrary to the received wisdom, retail trading increases share price
accuracy.” (emphasis omitted)).
59
Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets:
Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 704–06 (noting that “[t]he central aim of the securities
laws is to deter fraud” and arguing that a rule of agent liability supplemented by criminal enforcement is
more optimal than the current system of enterprise liability); see also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch,
Reassessing Damages in Securities Fraud Class Actions, 66 MD. L. REV. 348, 380–86 (2007)
(discussing deterrence by private class actions and optimal investor compensation).
60
Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private Securities Litigation, 2009 WIS. L.
REV. 333, 334 (describing the circularity problem as “private securities litigation [being] socially
wasteful because it merely transfers funds from one set of shareholders to another”).
61
See Arlen & Carney, supra note 59, at 721 (“[G]enerally Fraud on the Market cases are either
dismissed at a preliminary stage or settled.”).
62
See, e.g., Hillary A. Sale, Judges Who Settle 9–10 (Wash. Univ. in St. Louis Sch. of Law Legal
Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 11-03-02, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/

168

106:157 (2012)

The Plight of the Individual Investor

constitutes a circular payment from current shareholders to class-period
shareholders. If a class-period shareholder held at least some of its shares
after the fraud, one could argue that in participating in a securities class
action it is de facto shifting money from its left pocket to its right, minus an
attorney’s fee. There can be a similarly circular quality to payments made
by publicly held underwriters and insurers, which may also be owned by
diversified shareholders of the issuer. In the long run, the argument goes, a
diversified shareholder will be as likely to pay into these settlements as it is
to be compensated by them, netting out somewhere close to zero, minus
attorneys’ fees. But recent work suggests that diversified investors can be
harmed by fraud.63 One empirical study shows that numerous large,
diversified institutional investors suffered substantial losses over a ten-year
period from securities fraud.64 Moreover, the entire market could suffer a
discount if fraud increases, thus harming investors.65
Even if one concludes that diversified investors are not harmed by
fraud, such investors should not necessarily be the focus of securities class
actions because it is concentrated, informed investors who add unique value
that is worthy of investor protection laws. For example, Jill Fisch notes that
capital-market efficiency is promoted by informed traders.66 Informed
traders research and analyze firm-specific information and then act on that
information by trading.67 Such traders do the work of efficient markets that
transparency alone cannot do—they incorporate public information into
stock prices.68 To make a profit, informed traders must obtain returns that

sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1785618 (noting that settlements are paid in substantial part by corporate
or insurer rather than individual payments).
63
Alicia Davis Evans, The Investor Compensation Fund, 33 J. CORP. L. 223, 225 (2007) (“All
investors, including diversified investors, can suffer substantial injury from securities fraud.”); James J.
Park, Shareholder Compensation as Dividend, 108 MICH. L. REV. 323, 341 (2009) (arguing that the
entire market may suffer fraud discount if fraud increases, thus harming diversified investors).
64
Alicia Davis Evans, The Investor Compensation Fund, 33 J. CORP. L. 223, 230 (2007) (citing
ANJAN V. THAKOR ET AL., THE ECONOMIC REALITY OF SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 12
(2005), available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/doc/the-economic-reality-of-securitiesclass-action-litigation).
65
James J. Park, Shareholder Compensation as Dividend, 108 MICH. L. REV. 323, 341 (2009)
(arguing that the entire market may suffer fraud discount if fraud increases, thus harming diversified
investors).
66
See Fisch, supra note 60, at 347 (“[I]nformed traders are a critical component of the market that
enables mandated disclosure to serve as a corporate-governance mechanism.”). For additional responses
to the circularity problem, see Merritt B. Fox, Why Civil Liability for Disclosure Violations When
Issuers Do Not Trade?, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 297; Lawrence E. Mitchell, The “Innocent Shareholder”: An
Essay on Compensation and Deterrence in Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 243;
and Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–2005: Of
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007).
67
Fisch, supra note 60, at 347.
68
See id. at 346–47.
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exceed the costs of research and analysis.69 Therefore, they adopt
undiversified (or concentrated) investment strategies.70
In contrast, diversified investors seek “a market rate of return by
eliminating firm-specific risk” (and reward).71 Perfectly diversified
investors reduce to zero their incentives to engage in costly information
gathering and analysis. While such passive diversified investing may be
rational from the perspective of a particular investor, taken to an extreme it
can be problematic for the market overall.72 Such investors freeload off of
the market efficiency created by informed traders without compensating
these traders for the costs of their research.73
Because informed traders concentrate their risks and trade on
information, they are likely to be net losers from fraud.74 Thus, securities
fraud class actions compensate concentrated investors at the expense of
insurance companies, underwriters, and diversified investors.75 Class actions
constitute a form of insurance provided by diversified investors to informed
traders in compensation for the positive externality of efficiency generated
by these informed traders.76
This rationale for securities class actions also supports the proposition
that they should be led by at least one undiversified lead plaintiff, a role that
would easily be inhabited here by an individual co-lead plaintiff. As is
described further below, individual investors tend to be concentrated
investors and if subjected to the screening process advocated in Part IV.A
they will likely also be informed traders. In contrast, the large institutional
investors that obtain lead plaintiff appointments tend to be more diversified
than most investors; in fact, some of them are required to be diversified.77
One need not embrace the view that concentrated, informed traders should
69

Id. at 346 (“[F]or an investor to benefit from firm-specific research, the potential profit from that
research must exceed the costs of research and analysis.”).
70
See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1069–70 (2007) (“Hedge funds, in contrast, do not see
themselves as vehicles for diversification; they engage in targeted hedges, rather than diversification, to
eliminate unwanted risk. More narrowly tailored strategies—such as activism—are thus more
appropriate for hedge funds than for mutual funds.” (footnote omitted)); see also Fisch, supra note 60, at
346–47 (“Thus, informed trading requires investors to limit their diversification and concentrate their
holdings in a limited number of issuers.”).
71
Fisch, supra note 60, at 346 (“The objective of diversification is to achieve a market rate of return
by eliminating firm-specific risk.”).
72
Id.
73
Id. at 347.
74
Id.
75
See id.
76
See id. at 347–48.
77
See, e.g., Craig C. Martin & Matthew H. Metcalf, The Fiduciary Duties of Institutional Investors
in Securities Litigation, 56 BUS. LAW. 1381, 1404–05 (2001) (stating that institutional investors such as
pension plans have affirmative duties under ERISA, such as diversifying the plan’s investments to
decrease the risk of losses).
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be the focus of securities class actions to recognize that, at a minimum,
adding an undiversified voice to the lead plaintiff group will make it more
representative of the class of fraud victims.
B. Delaware Adopts a Lead Plaintiff Selection Process
Modeled on the PSLRA
In Hirt v. United States Timberlands Service Co.,78 the Delaware
Chancery Court settled upon criteria for selecting lead plaintiffs modeled on
the PSLRA procedure and Delaware’s own TCW Technology Ltd.
Partnership v. Intermedia Communications, Inc.79 But in contrast to federal
courts’ congressional mandate to favor lead plaintiffs with the largest
absolute loss, Delaware’s “relative economic stakes” language has opened
the possibility for selection of a lead plaintiff with the largest loss relative to
its own assets. In Wiehl v. Eon Labs, Vice Chancellor Lamb encountered a
dispute between competing lead plaintiffs over who should represent the
class of shareholders.80 In so doing, he rejected the PSLRA approach of
appointing the lead plaintiff with the largest absolute loss. “If every
difference in economic stakes were given great weight, the court could
simply add up the number of shares and select the law firm with the largest
absolute representation. This is not Delaware law.”81 Vice Chancellor Lamb
then compared the relative stakes of the competing plaintiffs, who held
57,000 shares, 38,000 shares, and 1000 shares, respectively, noting that
“[o]ne supposes that this investment [of 1000 shares] is of some
significance to Huntsinger, an individual investor, and would cause him to
monitor his counsels’ conduct of the litigation.”82
More recently, in selecting lead plaintiffs and lead counsel in In re Del
Monte Foods Co. Shareholders Litigation, Vice Chancellor Laster noted the
size of lead-plaintiff applicants’ losses relative to their overall assets under
management in selecting a lead plaintiff that had a smaller absolute but
larger relative loss.83 This Article seeks to build on the principle suggested
in Hirt and In re Del Monte—that the incentive to monitor class counsel
stems, at least in part, from the relative size of the investor’s loss. The
appointment of an individual co-lead plaintiff would almost certainly mean
78

No. Civ.A. 19575, 2002 WL 1558342 (Del. Ch. July 3, 2002).
No. 18336, 2000 WL 1654504, at *4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2000) (instituting system of selecting lead
plaintiffs that is similar to PSLRA).
80
No. Civ.A. 1116-N, 2005 WL 696764, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 22, 2005).
81
Id. at *3. Ultimately, as is frequently the approach to lead plaintiff disputes in Delaware, Vice
Chancellor Lamb ordered the parties to settle it on their own. Id. at *4. But see, e.g., In re Del Monte
Foods Co. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6027-VCL, 2010 WL 5550677, at *2–3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2010)
(ordering submission of motions for appointment of lead plaintiff and lead counsel after failed efforts by
attorneys to form leadership structure).
82
Wiehl, 2005 WL 696764, at *3.
83
2010 WL 5550677, at *6–7.
79
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appointment of an individual whose losses are larger on a relative basis than
that of its institutional co-lead and who presumably would be more
motivated to seek a high settlement than the institution.
C. The Search for a Motivated and Sophisticated Lead Plaintiff
1. The Lead Plaintiff’s Motivation.—Consider two lead plaintiff
applicants: an institutional investor with $100 billion in assets and a $1
million loss and an individual with $1 million in assets and a $250,000 loss.
Under current practice, the institution will be selected lead plaintiff. Who
has greater incentive to zealously monitor class counsel? Some might argue
that the institutional investor does. First, the institution has the most to gain
from monitoring in absolute terms. On account of its experience and legal
acumen, it may also be able to monitor less expensively than an individual
can. On the other hand, institutions have agency costs that individuals do
not. Manager performance is based on measures that affect the institution’s
bottom line, including total assets, returns on investment, and growth of the
overall portfolio.84 Managers will concentrate their attention and expertise
on firm activities that contribute most to these measures, and that likely
excludes litigation over losses in one particular security.85
Consider recent research demonstrating the failure by institutional
investors to claim billions of dollars set aside for them in class action
settlements. In an empirical study whose results are as astonishing as they
are depressing, James Cox and Randall Thomas found that, on average, just
28% of eligible institutional investors filed claims in settled securities class
actions.86 The institutions’ average loss in these cases was $850,000 and the
average available recovery was $280,000.87 All these institutions needed to
do to recover these funds was fill out a claim form and mail it in. Failure to
do so breached the institutions’ fiduciary duties to their investors.88 In an
attempt to explain these lapses, Cox and Thomas noted:

84

See, e.g., Jonathan B. Berk & Richard Stanton, Managerial Ability, Compensation, and the
Closed-End Fund Discount, 62 J. FIN. 529, 530–31 (2007) (discussing types of manager compensation
and performance measures).
85
See, e.g., James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers:
Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate in
Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411, 412 (2005) (finding that large financial
institutions frequently do not make claims on money owed from class action litigation); see also Charles
Silver & Sam Dinkin, Incentivizing Institutional Investors to Serve as Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Fraud
Class Actions, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 471, 481 (2008) (discussing high opportunity costs for institutional
investors who serve as lead plaintiffs in securities class actions).
86
Cox & Thomas, supra note 85, at 424.
87
Id. at 424–25.
88
See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: Do Institutional Investors
Fail to File Claims in Securities Class Actions?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 855, 867, 879 (2002) (noting
noncollection could be a potential breach of fiduciary duty).
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[I]nstitutional managers who . . . assess the desirability of identifying and
submitting claims in the context of the overall activities of the fund can easily
conclude that there are far better places to expend the fund’s resources. That is,
managers who view their objective as being well-performing traders (i.e.,
beating the market) are less likely to value operations that are removed from
that role. For example, a few fund managers commented rather casually to us
that they did not value submitting claims because the expected gains of doing
so were dwarfed by both the size of the fund’s assets and the average yearly
returns earned by the fund through wise investment strategies.89

Concededly, institutional investors who obtain lead plaintiff
appointments have incurred large losses that attracted their attention to the
fraud (or attracted the lawyers’ attention to the fraud) and have committed
to the litigation in a way that differentiates them from the passive
institutional investors described in the Cox and Thomas paper. But their
commitment should not be overstated. As noted earlier, institutions are
frequently alerted to their losses by the plaintiffs’ law firms that monitor
their portfolios.90 It is possible that, even though these losses are large
enough to qualify them for lead plaintiff appointments, they might never act
on them on their own because of their relative triviality on the balance
sheet. Litigating these losses remains outside the managers’ core
competencies, and a successful outcome adds little to the fund’s bottom
line. Oversight of the suit may be assigned to peripheral personnel within
the institution.91 And the institution may also defer to those who alerted
them to the loss in the first place—those who have the greatest interest in
the outcome of the suit and the greatest expertise—the lawyers. This
delegation might occur despite the fact that under the class action system,
the courts charge lead plaintiffs with the responsibility to monitor the
attorneys rather than allowing attorneys to police themselves.
The purpose of this argument is not to impugn institutional investor
lead plaintiffs who have, in many respects, improved outcomes for
shareholders since embracing pursuit of securities class actions at the
beginning of the last decade.92 It is to demonstrate that consideration of the
fraud’s impact relative to the total assets of the lead plaintiff may signify
89

Cox & Thomas, supra note 85, at 431 (footnote omitted).
Rubenstein, supra note 49, at 219 (noting that monitoring firms alert institutional investors to
potential suits).
91
Cox & Thomas, supra note 85, at 432 (“There is also the distinct possibility that breakdowns
occur within the institution or the custodian. Lines of authority, once clearly established, may, with the
passage of time and personnel, become blurred or forgotten. One can imagine that institutions or
custodians could assign to one of their staffers responsibility for handling all matters related to the
institution’s possible securities claims.”).
92
See, e.g., 2009 Securities Litigation Study, PWC SEC. LITIG. STUDY (PriceWaterhouseCoopers
LLP, New York, N.Y.), Apr. 2010, at 22, available at http://10b5.pwc.com/pdf/ny-100559%20sec%20lit%20study_v7%20print.pdf (“[N]ine of the top ten settlements reached in 2009 had
institutional investors as the lead plaintiff.”).
90
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the plaintiff’s motivation to monitor class counsel and maximize class
recovery. This relative impact should not be the only consideration. No one
wants lead plaintiffs who lost all $28.34 of their net worth in one stock
fraud; substantial absolute losses remain probative of lead plaintiff interest,
effort, and sophistication. But it remains true that for institutional investors,
most stock frauds are rounding errors. For individuals, they can be lifealtering experiences.93
Skeptics might argue that it is not enough for individual lead plaintiffs
to have incurred high losses on a relative or absolute basis. Such plaintiffs
must believe that the increased recovery they can obtain by personally
serving as lead plaintiffs will outweigh the costs of service (notwithstanding
that they are entitled to reimbursement of reasonable costs and expenses).94
Their optimal position would be to free ride off the efforts of other
sophisticated and motivated individual lead plaintiffs. Of course, the same
arguments hold for institutional lead plaintiffs, whose interests might be
optimally served through appointment of another sophisticated institutional
lead plaintiff. Nevertheless, institutional investors comprise 40% of all lead
plaintiffs.95
This may be because lead plaintiff applicants, whether they be
institutions or individuals, are not motivated by purely economic interests in
deciding to take part in litigation. In addition to believing that they can
improve settlements to their own benefit, lead plaintiff applicants may be
motivated to serve by a sense of moral and civic duty to act in the face of
fraud.96 As Bobby Deal, a sheriff and board member of the repeat-leadplaintiff Jacksonville Police and Fire Pension Fund once told me: “Half of
my guys carry axes, and the other half carry guns. We put bad guys in jail
for a living. We are not about to sit back and let someone steal from our
members and the investing public.”97 Just as an individual who serves on
the board of an institution may be motivated to vote in favor of seeking a
lead-plaintiff appointment by a sense of personal outrage in the face of

93

See, e.g., In re Critical Path, Inc. Sec. Litig., 156 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1108, 1113 (N.D. Cal. 2001)
(declining to appoint as lead plaintiff an individual who lost $1.9 million in the alleged fraud, a “very
substantial portion” of his family’s net worth, instead appointing the Florida State Board of
Administration with losses of $2.3 million on total assets under management of $125.6 billion).
94
Under the PSLRA, lead plaintiffs are entitled to reimbursement of “reasonable costs and
expenses.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(4) (2006). Still, some potential applicants may prefer not to incur even
reimbursable expenses devoted to litigation.
95
See 2003 Securities Litigation Study, supra note 46, at 6. For a more in-depth discussion of
institutional investor participation as lead plaintiffs in state-level transactional class actions, which have
many parallels to securities fraud class actions, see Webber, supra note 7 ( section entitled “Basic
Statistics—Institutional Lead Plaintiff Characteristics”).
96
David H. Webber, Is “Pay-to-Play” Driving Public Pension Fund Activism in Securities Class
Actions? An Empirical Study, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2031, 2071 (2010).
97
Id. In Part IV.A, I discuss some cases in which apparently qualified individual investors have
applied for lead plaintiff appointments but were rejected in favor of institutions.
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fraud, individual investors acting on their own behalf might be similarly
motivated.
2. The Sophistication of the Lead Plaintiff.—Ideally, in addition to
being motivated, a lead plaintiff should also be sufficiently sophisticated to
manage class counsel.98 There is, however, some controversy about this
point too. Some courts have noted that Congress’s adoption of the “largest
financial interest” test meant that Congress did not in fact value
sophistication as an important quality in a lead plaintiff.99 But these courts
were addressing cases in which institutional investors challenged an
individual’s presumptive lead plaintiff status, charging that the individual
lacked the requisite sophistication to be lead plaintiff.100 That these courts
refused to override the largest financial interest requirement in favor of the
purportedly superior sophistication of the institutions does not mean that
sophistication is not a valued factor in selecting lead plaintiffs. Two circuit
courts of appeals and one district court in the Southern District of New
York—the most frequent venue for securities class actions—have noted that
the quest for a sophisticated lead plaintiff is one of the purposes of the
PSLRA.101 Arguably, the PSLRA standard creating a presumption favoring
selection of the applicant with the largest loss implicitly prioritizes
98

In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 404 F.3d 173, 192 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Thus the PSLRA strives to
ensure that the lead plaintiff will have both the incentive and the capability to supervise its counsel in the
best interests of the class.”). For a more general discussion of the adequacy of representation of lead
plaintiffs in class actions, see Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV.
1136, 1151 (2009) (describing the doctrine of adequate representation as handling two distinct problems:
the “incompetence” and “indifference” of lead plaintiffs).
99
In re Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d 726, 737 n.20 (9th Cir. 2002) (“If financial sophistication had been
Congress’ principal concern, it would not have made the plaintiff who lost the most money the
presumptive lead plaintiff.”).
100
See, e.g., Zhu v. UCBH Holdings, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1054 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (declining
to appoint an institutional lead plaintiff over an individual lead plaintiff with a larger stake, even though
the individual may have been less sophisticated than the institution); Tanne v. Autobytel, Inc., 226
F.R.D. 659, 670 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“Although the PSLRA was enacted to encourage institutional
investors to take a more active role in securities litigation, the Ninth Circuit has held that it does not
require[ ] the district court to select the plaintiff it believes is the most sophisticated investor available.
As a consequence, there is no per se rule requiring that an institutional investor be appointed lead
plaintiff in lieu of an individual who has a larger stake in the litigation.” (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)).
101
See Berger v. Compaq Computer Corp., 279 F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (“[W]e mean
to emphasize that Congress enacted the ‘lead plaintiff’ provisions of the PSLRA, 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(a)(3)(B), to direct courts to appoint, as lead plaintiff, the most sophisticated investor available and
willing so to serve in a putative securities class action.”); In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 266
(3d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he goal of the Reform Act’s lead plaintiff provision is to locate a person or entity
whose sophistication and interest in the litigation are sufficient to permit that person or entity to function
as an active agent for the class.”); In re EVCI Career Colls. Holding Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 05 Civ.
10240(CM), 2007 WL 2230177, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2007) (“The PSLRA was enacted in part to
ensure that sophisticated institutional investors . . . would participate in and control securities
litigation.”).
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sophistication in a lead plaintiff. The entities with the largest losses are not
just institutions, but often the very largest institutions, who are most likely
to be both financially and legally sophisticated.
What constitutes sophistication sufficient for lead plaintiff purposes
remains hazy. The few courts that have addressed the issue suggest that it is
a combination of financial and legal sophistication, with evidence of the
former regularly taken as evidence of the latter. In addition to judging a lead
plaintiff’s acumen by reference to which law firm it selected as lead
counsel, courts have concluded that individual investors making substantial
securities decisions—such as trading in tens of thousands of shares102 or
serving as officers or directors of private companies103—have the
sophistication necessary to serve as lead plaintiffs in a securities class
action. Institutional investors, on the other hand, tend to be viewed as per se
sophisticated.104
The prospect of appointing individual-investor lead plaintiffs raises the
concern that individuals who suffer relatively large losses—who may be
among the least diversified members of the class—may not be sophisticated
enough for the job. Put bluntly, could individuals with large losses be the
biggest buffoons in the class? They might be. For example, they might have
irrationally invested their life savings in one stock. In theory, such plaintiffs
could still furnish some value to the class; the institution could provide the
sophistication and these foolish individuals the motivation. But it is just as
likely, perhaps more likely, that such individuals are former employees who
amassed significant shareholdings in the course of their employment or are
the heirs of such employees. Or it may be that they are sophisticated
individuals who believed in the company and relied on the integrity of its
public filings to take a calculated risk to aggressively invest in what turned
out to be a fraudulent enterprise. A core mission of securities enforcement
generally, including securities class actions, is to ensure that mere reliance
on the integrity of our system of disclosure does not itself become a mark of
an investor’s lack of sophistication.105 In the next Part, I survey the finance
literature on individual investors, including individual investors who pursue
the kinds of concentrated investment strategies that could make them
motivated candidates for lead-plaintiff appointments. The purpose of this
review is to dispel the notion that individual investors, even those pursuing
102

See, e.g., Ferrari v. Gisch, 225 F.R.D. 599, 609 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (appointing a three-person lead
plaintiff group who purchased 20,000 shares, 11,600 shares, and 897 shares, respectively).
103
See, e.g., Mohanty v. BigBand Networks, Inc., No. C 07-5101 SBA, 2008 WL 426250, at *9
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2008) (appointing a lead plaintiff because, in part, of his work on boards “of both
privately held and NASDAQ listed companies”).
104
See, e.g., Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 132 F.3d 1017, 1029 (4th Cir. 1997)
(finding a bank to be a sophisticated investor); Fletcher, supra note 30, at 1152–53 (concluding there
should be a “conclusive presumption” that all institutional investors are sophisticated).
105
See generally Fletcher, supra note 30, at 1149–53 (discussing investor sophistication, or lack
thereof).
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such strategies, are per se unsophisticated and therefore unsuited for even
cursory consideration as lead plaintiffs.
II. ARE INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS INHERENTLY UNSOPHISTICATED?
SURVEYING THE CURRENT FINANCE LITERATURE
Historically, individual investors have fared poorly in the finance
literature, securing a reputation for being “at best uninformed, at worst
fools.”106 Brad Barber and Terrance Odean report that an average individual
investor owns just four stocks,107 and several studies suggest that the
portfolios of American households are underdiversified.108 A recent study
by William Goetzmann and Alok Kumar concludes that U.S. individual
investors hold underdiversified portfolios in which the level of
underdiversification “is greater among younger, low-income, less-educated,
and less-sophisticated investors. The level of under-diversification is also
correlated with investment choices that are consistent with over-confidence,
trend-following behavior, and local bias.”109 Frequent explanations for
individual investors’ underdiversification include a lack of sophistication
and the fact that they incur transaction fees when actively trading their own
stocks.110
But a fair reading of the current finance literature presents a more
complex picture of individual investors. Even Goetzmann and Kumar report
the “most surprising” result that high-turnover, underdiversified portfolios
outperform high-turnover, better-diversified portfolios, indicating that “a
small, active group of under-diversified investors might be skilled.”111 And
while they still conclude that most investors could improve their
performance by simply investing in passive, diversified index funds, they
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See, e.g., Coval, Hirshleifer & Shumway, supra note 2, at 6.
Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Trading Is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The Common Stock
Investment Performance of Individual Investors, 55 J. FIN. 773, 796 (2000).
108
See, e.g., Marshall E. Blume & Irwin Friend, The Asset Structure of Individual Portfolios and
Some Implications for Utility Functions, 30 J. FIN., 585 (1975); Morgan Kelly, All Their Eggs in One
Basket: Portfolio Diversification of US Households, 27 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 87 (1995); Ronald C.
Lease, Wilbur G. Lewellen & Gary G. Schlarbaum, The Individual Investor: Attributes and Attitudes,
29 J. FIN. 413, 429–31 (1974) (explaining that the individual investor tends to invest almost entirely in
equity securities to the exclusion of other asset categories).
109
William N. Goetzmann & Alok Kumar, Equity Portfolio Diversification, 12 REV. FIN. 433, 449–
52 (2008). (“[W]ealthier, more experienced, and financially sophisticated investors and those who
exhibit a stronger propensity to diversify in other settings hold relatively better diversified stock
portfolios. . . . At least three psychological biases could be associated with investors’ diversification
choices, [including] over-confidence in their investment abilities, . . . stronger propensity to hold local
stocks, [and] . . . greater sensitivity to past price trends.”).
110
See Barber & Odean, supra note 107, at 776 (finding that the costs and frequency of trading
damaged the amount of individuals’ portfolio returns).
111
Goetzmann & Kumar, supra note 109, at 435.
107
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also conclude that “some investors under-diversify because they might have
superior private information.”112
Current financial scholarship supports this notion that there are
undiversified yet skilled individual investors who outperform the market.
Zoran Ivković, Clemens Sialm, and Scott Weisbrenner’s study of individual
investors concludes that “among households with portfolios large enough to
diversify among many stocks, if desired, the holdings and trades made by
those focusing their attention on a few securities tend to perform
significantly better than the investments made by those diversifying across
many stocks.”113 They further conclude that “wealthy households who
concentrate their holdings in a few stocks tend to have the ability to identify
superior stock picks.”114 Their data show, inter alia, that purchases made by
diversified investors of any portfolio size underperform the Fama/French
benchmark portfolios,115 as do concentrated households with small
portfolios.116 However, concentrated households with large portfolios
exceed Fama/French benchmark portfolios by 1.3% for those with
relatively large portfolios (defined as at least $25,000) and by 2.2% for
those with large portfolios (defined as at least $100,000).117 At least some
individual investors outperform the market for some period of time.
Such skilled investors “exploit information asymmetries by
concentrating their portfolios in the stocks about which they have favorable
information.”118 Earlier articles by Ivković and Weisbenner and by Massimo
Massa and Andrei Simonov demonstrate that individual investments in
local stocks outperform their investments in nonlocal stocks, that investors
exhibit a strong tendency to hold stocks in companies to which they are
geographically or professionally close, and that such investments earn, on
average, excess returns.119 Thus, Ivković, Sialm, and Weisbenner suggest
112

Id. at 461.
Zoran Ivković, Clemens Sialm & Scott Weisbenner, Portfolio Concentration and the
Performance of Individual Investors, 43 J. FIN. & QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 613, 653 (2008) (emphasis
added).
114
Id.
115
The Fama/French Benchmark Portfolios are six single-asset-class portfolios categorized by
market equity and book-to-market ratio against which other portfolios may be compared. See Kenneth
R. French, Description of Fama/French Benchmark Portfolios, KENNETH R. FRENCH,
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/f-f_portfolios.html (last visited
Mar. 24, 2012).
116
Ivković, Sialm & Wiesbenner, supra note 113, at 616.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 617; see also Zoran Ivković & Scott Weisbenner, Local Does as Local Is: Information
Content of the Geography of Individual Investors’ Common Stock Investments, 60 J. FIN. 267, 267
(2005) (“Behold, the fool saith, ‘Put not all thine eggs in the one basket’—which is but a manner of
saying, ‘Scatter your money and your attention’; but the wise man saith, ‘Put all your eggs in the one
basket and—watch that basket.’” (quoting Mark Twain)).
119
Ivković & Weisbenner, supra note 118, at 268–69; Massimo Massa & Andrei Simonov,
Hedging, Familiarity and Portfolio Choice, 19 REV. FIN. STUD. 633, 667–69 (2006).
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that at least some underdiversification or concentration may be driven not
by typical hallmarks of the unsophisticated investor, such as familiarity bias
or overconfidence, but by favorable information, particularly in the form of
local investment.120
Joshua Coval, David Hirshleifer, and Tyler Shumway echo a similar
theme. Using a large sample of accounts at a major discount brokerage firm,
they test the persistence of individual performance results evaluating both
long horizons (the holding period for the investment) and short horizons
(average returns the week after each purchase).121 Their results demonstrate,
inter alia, that for the long horizon, investors in the top performance decile
outperform those in the bottom decile by about 8% per year.122 Over the
short horizon, individual investors in the top decile earn between twelve
and fifteen basis points a day; individuals in the bottom decile lose between
eleven and twelve basis points per day.123 As the authors note, “If those
individual investors who have performed abnormally well in the past
continue to perform abnormally well in the future by an amount that is not
explained by mere chance, market efficiency may be violated.”124 In
explanation, the authors note that these consistently high-performing
individual investors may be better able to exploit informational advantages
than, say, mutual fund managers (whose abnormal performance typically
lags behind the market overall). For example, because these individual
investors trade small positions, their trades have little if any impact on
prices, allowing them to better exploit smaller or short-term deviations from
fundamental values.125 Moreover, unlike mutual funds, individuals are not
obliged to maintain diversified investment portfolios.126
The presence of sophisticated and concentrated individual investors in
the marketplace does not mean they are to be found as class members in
every—or, in theory, in any—class action or that they would be willing to
serve as lead plaintiffs. Nor are such investors identical to the potential
individual lead plaintiffs outlined above, whose losses, relative to their total
assets, are high. The concentrated investors described in the finance
literature have not necessarily invested a large percentage of their net worth
in one stock (or a few stocks); rather, they have invested a large percentage
of their portfolio in one stock (or a few stocks). It is possible that their
portfolio represents a small percentage of their overall assets. It is possible
that on account of their sophistication, they are much less likely to be
defrauded, although to believe this one would have to believe that they
120
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123
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125
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Ivković, Sialm & Weisbenner, supra note 113, at 617.
Coval, Hirshleifer & Shumway, supra note 2, at 3.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 7.
Id.
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know of or can detect the fraud before the rest of the market. Despite these
positive indicators that there are many savvy individual investors out there,
it is possible that a rule favoring an individual co-lead plaintiff who
suffered the largest relative loss would hand a leadership role to the biggest
fool in the class (though the judicial screening of such plaintiffs proposed
below should eliminate this possibility). Of course, it is also possible that
sophisticated, concentrated investors who have invested a substantial
portion of their assets in one stock or a few stocks and were defrauded
would like to obtain lead plaintiff appointments and would make excellent
lead plaintiffs for the class as a whole (and in particular, for individual
investors), but have no chance to obtain a leadership role under the current
system, even if they wanted to.
The point of reviewing the finance literature is not to suggest that such
ideal individual investors may be found to co-lead every class action
(though with classes composed of thousands or tens of thousands of
investors, there likely would be some candidates). It is to respond to the
view that individual investors, particularly concentrated ones, are per se
unsophisticated, need to be protected from themselves, and cannot serve as
guardians for other investors. As a group, individual investors may
underperform institutional investors, but that does not automatically make
institutional investors the optimal class representatives. The finance
literature suggests that some concentrated individual investors are
sophisticated; basic economic and psychological principles suggest they are
likely to be highly motivated. The question of whether it is worthwhile to
invest the small effort required to open a co-lead plaintiff appointment to
individuals requires an assessment of why institutional investors may not
adequately represent individuals.
III. THE POTENTIALLY MISALIGNED INTERESTS OF INDIVIDUAL AND
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23’s Typicality and Adequacy
Requirements
It is a bedrock principle of American law, one that has been repeatedly
(and recently) reaffirmed by the Supreme Court, that a person cannot be
bound to a judgment in a court proceeding to which she was not a party.127
That principle has been strained but not broken by the rise of the modern
class action.128 Among the modern concessions embodied in Rule 23 was
the grouping together of claims into a class action simply because it was
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Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 906 (2008) (stating that under agency law, “preclusion is
appropriate only if the putative agent’s conduct of the suit is subject to the control of the party who is
bound by the prior adjudication”).
128
See, e.g., ISSACHAROFF, supra note 9, at 80–83.
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more efficient to resolve similar claims in one unified case.129 Specifically,
Rule 23(b)(3) permits certification of a class upon a determination that
“questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating
the controversy.”130 Words like “predominate” and “superior” allow for the
inclusion of overlapping but not identical claims in the class action
mechanism for efficiency purposes.131 Virtually all securities class actions
are brought under this mechanism.132 Ordinarily, because only parties that
actually participate in a lawsuit are bound by the judgment, Rule 23
requires the trial court to inquire directly into the adequacy of the
representation that absent class members will be afforded by a prospective
lead plaintiff.133
Rule 23(a)(3) requires that “the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class,” and Rule 23(a)(4)
requires that the named parties “will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.”134 The adequacy inquiry under Rule 23(a)(4) serves
“to uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the class they
seek to represent.”135 This adequacy inquiry has heightened importance in
the context of Rule 23(b)(3) damages class actions because such actions by
definition encompass claims by absent class members that may not align
perfectly with those of the lead plaintiffs. A party may be bound to a
judgment in which it arguably had no meaningful opportunity to participate
as long as the representative plaintiff was just that—representative of class
members.136 By asserting claims that are typical of the class’s claims and by
furnishing adequate representation of those claims in terms of competent,
supervised counsel, the class’s interests are actually represented in the court
proceeding to which they will be bound.137 As a further procedural
129

Id. at 83.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (emphasis added).
131
See ISSACHAROFF, supra note 9, at 86.
132
see also Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities Law:
Managing Jurisdictional Conflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 14, 30 (2007) (“Plaintiffs in securities
class actions generally proceed under Rule 23(b)(3) . . . .”); cf. ISSACHAROFF, supra note 9, at 82 (“[T]he
1966 reforms to Rule 23 brought to life a range of economic harm cases that were almost unimaginable
previously, as with securities class actions.).
133
ISSACHAROFF, supra note 9, at 80.
134
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3)–(4).
135
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625–26 (1997) (“[A] class representative must
be part of the class and ‘possess the same interest and suffer the same injury’ as the class members.”
(quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216 (1974))).
136
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (stating the class action requirements); G. Chin Chao, Securities Class
Actions and Due Process, 1996 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 547, 559 (noting that Rule 23(b)(3) class
members are bound by res judicata if they do not opt out of the class).
137
See Chao, supra note 136, at 558 (discussing certification of a class action under Rule 23); see
also ISSACHAROFF, supra note 9, at 79 (“For those whose rights are to be decided in absentia the critical
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safeguard for the rights of absent class members, these members retain the
right to opt out of the class action and bring their own suit.138 However, as a
practical matter, because many claims made by individual investors are
negative-value claims, opting out is rarely an economically feasible
option.139 Either they will obtain a remedy for the losses through a class
action, or they will obtain no remedy at all.
The ensuing sections discuss four conflicts between institutional and
individual investors that implicate Rule 23, including: (1) derivatives
trading, (2) selling versus holding shareholders, (3) corporate governance
activism, and (4) state-level transactional litigation in which institutional
investors hold a stake in both the acquirer and the target. Although I will
argue that these conflicts largely break down along institutional versus
individual lines, they do not do so perfectly. There may be individuals who
trade derivatives or pursue corporate governance activism while there may
be institutions that do neither or that hold a stake only in a target company
in a litigation. Taking a purist approach, one could transform the lead
plaintiff group into a noisy parliament by separately selecting lead plaintiffs
for derivatives traders, sellers, holders, class members seeking corporate
governance reform, 10b-5 claimants, § 11 claimants, etc., increasing the
group’s size and reducing its cohesiveness, perhaps solving these conflicts
without reference to the institutional–individual dichotomy at all.
But maintaining this dichotomy as an analytical framework for
intraclass conflicts retains several advantages. First, much of securities
regulation as currently constituted makes distinctions between institutional
and individual investors. Second, the institutional–individual dichotomy
reflects not just the law, but also the reality of the marketplace. Institutions
and individuals trade through different brokerage platforms and may even
pay different prices for the same securities.140 Finally, because these
due process issue is the quality of the representation that was afforded. It is the adequacy of that
representation that allows this extraordinary departure from the conventional rule that each individual is
entitled to his or her own opportunity to control any litigation that threatens to impose liability or
terminate a claim.”).
138
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v); Chao, supra note 136, at 574–75 (“[T]he current practice is to
require notice and an opportunity to appear or to opt out only for (b)(3) classes while (b)(1) and (b)(2)
classes receive notice only in certain instances such as settlements.”).
139
See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action
Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1532–33 (2004) (discussing rarity
of opt-outs and objectors in class actions).
140
See Graham Bowley, Stock Exchange Shrinks as Rivals Take Over Trades, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15,
2009, at A1 (noting the existence of “dark pools” and their availability to institutional investors only).
Compare Contact Us, BLOOMBERG TRADEBOOK, http://www.bloombergtradebook.com/landing (last
visited Mar. 24, 2012) (“Please note that Bloomberg Tradebook is only available for institutional
trading.”), and Electronic Trading Services, MF GLOBAL, http://www.mfglobal.com/equities/electronictrading-services (last visited Mar. 24, 2012) (“MF Global’s team of electronic trading professionals
provides execution and clearing services to institutional clients.”), with About Us, E*TRADE,
https://us.etrade.com/e/t/home/aboutus (last visited Mar. 24, 2012) (“[E*TRADE] empower[s]
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conflicts tend to break down along institutional and individual lines,
selection of one additional (individual) lead plaintiff who has been properly
screened for these conflicts allows a court to solve several of them with just
one additional appointment. For these reasons, this Article maintains the
institutional–individual dichotomy in analyzing intraclass conflicts in
securities class actions.
B. Conflicts Between Institutional and Individual Investors
1. Derivatives Trading and Lead Plaintiff Appointments.—
Derivatives trading and the failure to properly account for it causes two
problems with regard to the lead plaintiff selection process. The first
problem is that omission of derivatives from the largest financial interest
calculation may lead to the appointment of lead plaintiff applicants who do
not actually have the largest financial interest in the litigation.141
Theoretically, they may even have a negative interest in it. The second
problem is that derivatives trading, when accounted for properly, raises
unique defenses that may render derivatives traders atypical and inadequate
class
representatives.
The current treatment of derivatives
disproportionately harms individual investors who stand to benefit most
from resolution of these conflicts.
a. Calculation of the Largest Financial Interest.—Derivatives
are financial instruments such as put options, call options, and equity swaps
whose value derives from the value of an underlying asset.142 Some
derivatives are defined as securities in both the Securities Act of 1933143 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.144 In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, the United States Supreme Court noted that the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 treats such derivative investors as purchasers or sellers of

individuals to take control of their financial futures by providing the products, tools and services they
need to meet their near- and long-term investing goals.”).
141
See Mohanty v. BigBand Networks, Inc., No. C 07-5101 SBA, 2008 WL 426250, at *6–7 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 14, 2008) (“[D]istrict courts typically equate ‘largest financial interest’ with the amount of
potential recovery.” (citing In re Critical Path, Inc. Sec. Litig., 156 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1107–08 (N.D.
Cal. 2001)).
142
See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 334–36 (11th ed. 2009) (discussing treatment of derivatives, particularly swaps, under
securities laws).
143
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006) (“The term ‘security’ means any note,
stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture, . . . or . . . any put, call, straddle, [or]
option . . . .”).
144
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2006) (“The term ‘security’ means
any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture, . . . or any put, call, straddle, [or]
option . . . .”).
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securities for purposes of Rule 10b-5.145 Subsequently, the Commodity
Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA) amended Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act to cover “security-based swap agreements,”
although it simultaneously exempted such agreements from the registration
requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.146
More recently, Title VII of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank) was passed to provide for
comprehensive regulation of previously unregulated swaps and securitybased swap agreements.147 Some securities-based swap agreements will now
be cleared through clearinghouses rather than traded over-the-counter via
bilateral agreements whose infamous opaqueness was at least partly
responsible for the financial panic of 2008.148 Dodd–Frank instructed the
appropriate regulators, including the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission and, more relevantly for purposes of this Article, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), to issue rules designating which swap
agreements required clearance and which could continue to be traded over-
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Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 751 (1975) (“[T]he holders of puts,
calls, options, and other contractual rights or duties to purchase or sell securities have been recognized
as ‘purchasers’ or ‘sellers’ of securities for purposes of Rule 10b-5 . . . .”); id. at 750–51 (citing 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (defining “buy” or “purchase” as including contracts to “buy, purchase, or otherwise
acquire”) and § 78c(a)(14) (defining terms “sale” and “sell” to include contracts “to sell or otherwise
dispose of”)).
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Pub. L. No. 106-554, § E302-03, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-451 to 454; see also Caiola v. Citibank,
N.A., 295 F.3d 312, 327 (2d Cir. 2002) (implying that prior to passage of CFMA, some derivatives such
as equity swaps were neither registered as securities nor subject to the antifraud provisions of the
securities laws).
147
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 763(g),
124 Stat. 1376, 1777–78 (2010) (amending Section 9 of the Exchange Act); see also New Rules for
Derivatives, COVINGTON & BURLING LLP 1 (July 21, 2010), http://www.cov.com/files/
Publication/f11bd6db-d8f2-46d1-b91b-da0b30a44157/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/883225768e12-48ab-8c61-daca964bb4e0/Dodd-Frank%20Act%20-%20New%20Rules%20for%20Derivatives.
pdf.
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Press Release, House Democratic Comm. on Fin. Servs., In the Wake of Global Debt Crises,
House Democrats Call for Implementation of Reforms in the Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (June 29, 2011), available at http://democrats.financialservices.house.gov/press/
PRArticle.aspx?NewsID=1427 (“The lack of transparency—particularly in derivatives markets—was a
major cause of the recent crisis and remains a clear and present danger to the financial system.”); see
also New Rules for Derivatives, supra note 147, at 2 (“The effort to require central clearing and
exchange trading for many derivative actions is at the heart of two basic purposes of the [Dodd–Frank]
Act—reducing systemic risk and increasing market transparency.”).
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the-counter as they were prior to Dodd–Frank.149 This rulemaking process
was scheduled for completion in July 2011, though it remains ongoing.150
Undoubtedly, many derivatives that previously traded over the counter
will now be cleared.151 Clearing will provide transparent pricing that will,
among other things, simplify the calculation of investors’ exposure to
securities fraud or pending transactions.152 As discussed below, whether it is
because of the pre-Dodd–Frank (and hopefully not post-Dodd–Frank)
complexity of calculating such exposure or some other reason, lead plaintiff
applicants have often failed to plead, and courts have failed to include,
derivatives in the calculation of the “largest financial interest” for lead
plaintiff purposes. This omission is important, chiefly because a lead
plaintiff’s derivatives exposure affects its incentives to maximize recovery.
There are two legal impediments to including derivatives in calculation
of the largest financial interest. The first is the traditional notion that the
plaintiff is the “master of his complaint” and may therefore decide what
claims to include in it.153 If the “master” excludes derivatives from the
complaint, deliberately or otherwise, then derivatives almost certainly
won’t be incorporated into the case (even if an ideal social planner would
149

New Rules for Derivatives, supra note 147, at 2–3; see also Dan Awrey, Regulating Financial
Innovation: A More Principles-Based Proposal?, 5 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 273, 297 302
(2011) (discussing OTC derivatives, the role they have played in the global financial collapse, and the
difficulty of regulating them).
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See Dodd-Frank
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2–4
(July
22,
2011),
http://www.davispolk.com/files/uploads/FIG/072211_Dodd_Frank_Progress_Report.pdf (noting July
2011 implementation deadline and the SEC’s failure to meet it in several categories); see also
Implementing Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act—Upcoming Activity, U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/dfactivity-upcoming.shtml (last
modified Mar. 24, 2012) (setting forth schedule for further implementation of Dodd–Frank by the
Securities and Exchange Commission).
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See Press Release, House Democratic Comm. on Fin. Servs., supra note 148 ( “The [Dodd–
Frank Act] brings the derivatives markets out of the shadows by requiring reporting of all swap
transactions and by requiring exchange-trading and central clearing for most of them.” (emphasis
added)).
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See The Monitor, 29 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP., May 2010, at 29–30 (“To promote
public transparency, standard over-the-counter derivatives should be traded on exchanges or other
trading platforms. The more transparent a marketplace, the more liquid it is, the more competitive it is,
and the lower the costs for companies that use derivatives to hedge risk. Transparency brings better
pricing and lowers risk for all parties to a derivatives transaction. During the financial crisis, Wall Street
and the Federal Government had no price reference for particular assets. Financial reform is incomplete
without public market transparency.”); see also Derivatives—Protection Without Suffocation: Thriving
in a New Era of Regulatory and Market Transformation, BNY MELLON 4 (May 2010),
http://www.bnymellon.com/foresight/pdf/derivatives.pdf (“Central clearing has been shown to increase
transparency and reduce a variety of risks for OTC derivatives markets.”).
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Matthew O’Brien, Choice of Forum in Securities Class Actions: Confronting “Reform” of the
Securities Act of 1933, 28 REV. LITIG. 845, 895 (2009) (citing Katz v. Gerardi, No. 08CV04035, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76322, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 23, 2008) (noting plaintiff’s right to plead only claims
under the Securities Act of 1933 in securities litigation because “a plaintiff is the master of his
complaint”), rev’d on other grounds, 552 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2009)).
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include them) unless the “master” changes her mind or some other
derivatives complainant appears. The second, related impediment is the
unique timeline of securities class actions, in which the lead plaintiff is
selected based on the value of her claims in a complaint that may easily be
changed afterwards to include different claims. Therefore, whether
derivative claimants will ultimately be included in the class may not be
known until after the lead plaintiff has been selected. In short, it is never
certain that derivatives will be included in the case or, even if they are
ultimately included, that they will be taken into consideration at the lead
plaintiff selection stage.
As to the first point, plaintiffs are the “masters of the complaint” and
may select the claims presented.154 Thus, if a securities class action plaintiff
chooses to claim only for losses related to the common stock, even if that
plaintiff (or others) has losses in preferred stock or derivatives, the court
will not force the plaintiff to add claims for preferred stock or derivatives.
When applicants move for lead plaintiff status, the PSLRA requires merely
that they disclose their transactions “in the security that is the subject of the
complaint.”155 Thus, the court or the class may never know what other
securities the lead-plaintiff applicants bought or sold during the class
period. This Article will address the consequences of this below.
The second legal impediment relates to the timeline of securities class
actions. In most securities class actions, a plaintiffs’ law firm representing
an individual with a small financial stake files the initial complaint.156 Such
complaints tend to be filed within days after the fraud has been revealed.157
The initial plaintiff must then publish, in a “widely circulated national
business-oriented publication or wire service,” notice of the pendency of the
action advising class members that they have sixty days to seek the lead
plaintiff appointment.158 As a matter of practice, when institutional investors
move for lead plaintiff appointments, they do so within this sixty-day
window, typically taking several weeks to assess their exposure to the
fraud, the merits of the case, and the costs and benefits of obtaining the

154

See MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE
PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 23 (2009).
155
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A)(iv) (2006) (emphasis added).
156
See, e.g., John F. Olson, David C. Mahaffey & Brian E. Casey, Pleading Reform, Plaintiff
Qualification and Discovery Stays Under the Reform Act, 51 BUS. LAW. 1101, 1142–43 (1996)
(discussing the use of professional plaintiffs, who have a relatively small stake in the litigation, to
expedite filing a case).
157
See, e.g., id. at 1104–05 (citing In re Philip Morris Sec. Litig., 872 F. Supp. 97, 98 (S.D.N.Y.
1995), aff’d in part, rev’d and remanded in part, 75 F.3d 801 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that plaintiffs filed
the initial complaint fewer than five hours after Philip Morris’s announcement, with four more suits filed
that day and five more filed the following day)).
158
§ 78u-4(a)(3)(A)(i).
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appointment.159 Thus, institutions frequently obtain lead-plaintiff
appointments based on complaints written by another plaintiff,160 often an
individual who purchased common stock or who may use the formulaic
phrase “all investors who purchased common stock” or “purchasers of the
securities of [the issuer],”161 which excludes third party transactions like
derivatives.162 The institutional lead plaintiff applicants are therefore
disclosing their transactions “in the security that is the subject of the
complaint”163 that was written by someone else. For lead plaintiff purposes,
they calculate their financial interest in the case based on the securities
fortuitously chosen by a plaintiff who usually will only become lead
plaintiff if no one else is interested in the job. Alternatively, in the rarer
instance in which institutional lead plaintiff applicants file an initial
complaint, they may selectively plead claims over certain securities to
maximize the appearance of their losses.
Thus, either because of manipulation of the initial complaint by a lead
plaintiff applicant who authored it or, more likely, because of the fortuitous
159

See, e.g., Ferrari v. Gisch, 225 F.R.D. 599, 603 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (filing an original complaint on
October 1, 2003, with four motions for appointment of lead counsel filed on December 1, 2003, two of
which were filed by institutional investors).
160
See, e.g., Climo v. Office Depot, Inc., No. 11-cv-80364-CIV (S.D. Fla. July 5, 2011) (granting
Central Laborers’ Pension Fund’s motion for appointment as lead plaintiff and approving lead plaintiff’s
selection of counsel); Mallen v. Alphatec Holding, Inc., No. 10-cv-01673-BEN (CAB), 2011 WL
175687, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2011) (granting the unopposed motion to appoint FCERA as lead
plaintiff and approving selection of counsel); Wozniak v. Align Tech., Inc., No. 09-cv-03671-MMC
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2009), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/1043/ALGN09_01/20091113_
f01x_09CV03671.pdf (granting the motion to appoint PPNPF as lead plaintiff, denying the motion to
appoint Charles Wozniak as lead plaintiff, and approving lead plaintiff’s selection of counsel).
161
See, e.g., Complaint at 1, DeAngelis v. Corzine, No. 11-cv-07866-VM (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2011),
available at http://securities.stanford.edu/1047/MF00_01/2011113_f01c_1107866.pdf (“This is a federal
securities class action filed on behalf of all investors who purchased or otherwise acquired MF Global
common stock between May 20, 2011 and October 28, 2011, inclusive (‘the Class Period’) for violations
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the Securities
and Exchange Commission . . . .”); Complaint at 2, Short v. Dondanville, No. 11-cv-00615-VAP (C.D.
Cal. Apr. 19, 2011), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/1046/FCEN00_01/2011419_f01c_
1100615.pdf (“This is a securities class action brought by plaintiff on behalf of all persons who
purchased or otherwise acquired 1st Centennial Bancorp . . . securities . . . .”); Complaint at 1, Richman
v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 274 F.R.D. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 10-cv-03461-UA), available at
http://securities.stanford.edu/1044/GS10_01/2010426_f01c_10CV03461.pdf (“This is a securities class
action on behalf of all persons who were damaged in connection their purchases of Goldman Sachs
Group, Inc. . . . common stock . . . . “); Complaint at 2, Bristol Cnty. Ret. Sys. v. Wachovia Corp., No.
08-cv-02844-SC (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2008), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/1040/WB_03/
200866_f01c_082844.pdf (“This is a federal securities class action on behalf of purchasers of the
securities of Wachovia . . . .”).
162
Cf. COFFEE & SALE, supra note 142, at 20–21 (explaining that derivative securities are issued by
third parties and thus do not raise capital for the issuer); ALASTAIR HUDSON, THE LAW ON FINANCIAL
DERIVATIVES 92 (2d ed. 1998) (explaining that financial derivatives are the product of real-time
negotiation between institutional traders).
163
§ 78u-4(a)(2)(A)(iv) (emphasis added).
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selection of securities by the filer of the initial complaint, two problems
arise. First, the entity that has the largest financial interest in the securities
identified in the initial complaint will be selected lead plaintiff, rather than
the entity that actually has the largest financial interest in the lawsuit as a
whole. Thus, for example, whoever had the largest common stock loss will
be selected rather than the entity that had the largest loss in both common
and preferred stock. Second, and of greater concern, is the exclusion of
derivatives from the initial complaint and therefore from calculation of the
largest financial interest. Exclusion of derivatives means that a lead plaintiff
could collect more damages than it lost in the fraud. It could even collect
damages if it profited from the fraud.
Consider a lead plaintiff applicant whose common stock lost $10
million in value, but who purchased put options to hedge $9 million of its
exposure. Upon revelation of the fraud, it exercised the put options.164 Thus,
its net loss in the fraud is $1 million. But if all the complaint pleads are the
common stock losses, the PSLRA only requires it to disclose the $10
million loss in its lead plaintiff application. It could win the lead plaintiff
appointment and collect all $10 million in damages, or $9 million more than
it lost. (It could also claim $10 million in losses even if it were not selected
lead plaintiff.) Meanwhile, traders who used derivatives to increase—rather
than hedge—their exposure to the issuer would be ineligible to collect
damages at all because derivatives were not claimed in the complaint.
Assuming unsuccessful attempts at intervention by derivatives traders, the
lead plaintiff could proceed with its suit as filed. The lack of transparency
and clarity about the treatment of derivatives may fail to alert such long
derivatives traders to the problem until they are time-barred or precluded
from bringing separate claims, assuming such claims were substantial
enough to bring as an independent action.
The prospect of some investors reaping windfalls from the fraud while
others lack a remedy raises questions about the fundamental fairness of the
“master of the complaint” rule in this context. But it also raises issues from
the more narrow perspective of how hidden gains (or hidden offset losses)
may affect the lead plaintiffs’ motivation to monitor class counsel. For
purposes of this motivation alone, does it matter whether the $10 million
the lead plaintiff applicant can obtain in the class action is a windfall or a
recovery? From a purely rationalist point of view, it should make no
difference. All that matters for purposes of motivating the lead plaintiff’s
monitoring is how much it can recover from the suit: $10 million. What it
gained or lost in the fraud is irrelevant. A behavioralist might argue that
whether the $10 million is viewed by the investor as a windfall or as
164

Options, as well as futures and swaps, are financial instruments known as derivatives. Options
give the buyer a right to buy (a “call” option) or sell (a “put” option) an underlying asset, usually a
security or commodity, for a predetermined price (the “strike” price) at some point in the future. For
more information, see COFFEE & SALE, supra note 142, at 20–25.
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recovery may substantially affect its zeal for monitoring.165 There is
evidence that people are more responsive to loss aversion than windfalls.166
Derivatives pose a further complication when a complaint is later
amended to include them. As noted above, the “relief sought by the class”
may be expanded beyond the initial complaint to encompass nearly all
securities, including derivatives. The most likely scenario in which this
would occur is if the institution is forced to amend by late-arriving
derivatives complainants.167 Such complainants may not have incurred large
enough losses to obtain the lead plaintiff appointment but may seek to
intervene in the case. Alternatively, they may just approach the judge or the
plaintiffs’ lawyers seeking inclusion.
Returning to the above example, the hedged portion of the institutional
investor lead plaintiff’s $10 million common stock loss will now count
against it. The lead plaintiff who was once eligible to collect $10 million is
now limited to collecting no more than the $1 million of its actual loss.168
While this may be a more just result from the societal point of view, the
lead plaintiff’s motivation to monitor class counsel has been substantially
reduced. The plaintiffs’ lawyers who obtained the lucrative lead counsel
position, having been selected by a lead plaintiff with large common stock
losses, now report to a lead plaintiff with significantly diminished stakes in
the case and far lower monitoring incentives. This was exactly the problem
the PSLRA was designed to avoid.169
In the absence of hard data, certain proxies reveal the scope of the
problems posed by derivatives and lead plaintiff selection. First, the case
cited most frequently by district courts in calculating the largest financial
interest for lead plaintiff purposes, Lax v. First Merchants Acceptance

165

See discussion infra Part IV.A (advocating that courts consider both the relative and absolute
losses of individual applicants for co-lead-plaintiff appointments with institutions).
166
See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative
Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 297 (1992) (describing loss aversion biases).
167
See, e.g., In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig., 199 F.R.D. 119, 123–24 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(certifying shareholder class of common stock and options purchasers and sellers eighteen months after
appointing lead plaintiffs based on common stock losses alone).
168
See, e.g., Notice of Pendency and Certifications of Class Actions and Proposed Settlements,
Motions for Attorneys’ Fees and Settlement Fairness Hearings at 17, In re Nortel Networks Corp. Sec.
Litig., No. 04 Civ. 2115 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2006), available at http://www.
nortelsecuritieslitigation.com/notice_en2.pdf (“To the extent a Claimant had a gain from his, her or its
overall transactions in Nortel common stock and/or Nortel put and call options during the Class Period,
the value of the Recognized Claim will be zero. Such claimants will in any event be bound by the
Settlement. To the extent that a Claimant suffered an overall loss on his, her or its overall transactions in
Nortel common stock and/or options during the Class Period, but that loss was less than the Recognized
Claim calculated above, then the Recognized Claim shall be limited to the amount of the actual loss.”).
169
See S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 8 & n.34 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690 & n.34
(quoting Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 1, at 2105).
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Corp.170—an unreported opinion subsequently cited in 106 opinions
published on LexisNexis as of November 13, 2011 and in many more
motions for lead plaintiff appointments—excludes derivatives from its
calculation methodology.171 Second, practitioners report that they rarely
include derivatives in such calculations, in part because of the complexity
of assessing their value.172 The omission is likely a material one. Defendants
in securities class actions are large public companies,173 and defendants in
securities class actions led by institutional lead plaintiffs are likely to be
among the very largest public companies, as they generate high enough
damages to attract institutional applicants.174 Derivatives trading almost
certainly exists in the securities of all of these defendants, and therefore,
there are potential derivative claimants in all of these suits. It stands to
reason that there are a substantial number of institutional lead plaintiffs who
have hidden gains or offset losses potentially implicating their monitoring
motivation, or who simply do not have the largest financial interest in the
relief ultimately sought by the class.
As to how frequently complaints are expanded to include derivatives
after selection of the lead plaintiffs, proxies will again have to substitute for
hard data. There are two published opinions addressing the issue,175
170

No. 97 C 2715, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11866 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 6, 1997). This case is an
unreported opinion that has subsequently been cited in 106 opinions published on LexisNexis as of
November 13, 2011 and many more motions for lead plaintiff appointments.
171
Id. at *17 (calculating the largest financial interest for lead plaintiff purposes based on “(1) the
number of shares purchased; (2) the number of net shares purchased; (3) the total net funds expended by
the plaintiffs during the class period; and (4) the approximate losses suffered by the plaintiffs”). No
calculation of derivatives exposure is included.
172
This is based on confidential conversations taking place on January 4, 2011, and February 14,
2011, with veteran litigators at leading plaintiffs’ securities class action firms. These individuals had
direct and extensive experience drafting lead plaintiff applications.
173
See, e.g., Complaint, Richman v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 274 F.R.D. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(No. 10-cv-03461-UA), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/1044/GS10_01/2010426_f01c_
10CV03461.pdf; Complaint, Sklar v. Bank of Am., Corp., 258 F.R.D. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09MDL-2058), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/1042/BAC_01/2009121_f01c_09580.pdf; see
also Stephen P. Ferris & A.C. Pritchard, Stock Price Reactions to Securities Fraud Class Actions Under
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 4 (Univ. of Mich. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 01-009,
2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=288216 (characterizing
defendants in typical securities fraud class actions with traits unique to large public companies, such as a
large trading volume in a secondary trading market).
174
See James D. Cox et al., There Are Plaintiffs and . . . There Are Plaintiffs: An Empirical
Analysis of Securities Class Action Settlements, 61 VAND. L. REV. 355, 373 tbl.4 (2008) (showing that
the total assets for defendants in cases led by institutions are far higher than the total assets of defendants
in cases led by noninstitutions).
175
See, e.g., In re Sepracor Inc. Sec. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 52, 54 (D. Mass. 2005) (declining to find
that lead plaintiffs violated 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A)(iv) by failing to disclose derivative trades
because the complaint did not mention derivatives trades); In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
199 F.R.D. 119, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (declining to find that lead plaintiffs violated 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(a)(2)(A)(iv) by failing to disclose derivative trades because the court had not defined the class to
include such trades until after filing of lead plaintiff certifications).
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although this is an issue that courts may often decide without a formal
opinion. Growing understanding in the marketplace by derivatives traders
that they should not assume that they are automatically class members but
must look to how the class is defined may increase the frequency of
expansion.176 The actual or perceived frequency of expansion of the
complaint might affect institutional investor behavior ex ante. An institution
that has offsetting gains through derivatives might not seek a lead plaintiff
appointment for fear that its derivatives trading will eventually be exposed.
On the other hand, the participants who are most aware of such risks and
are best positioned to warn against them are the lawyers. And as noted
above, the lawyers frequently inform the institutions of their losses via
portfolio monitoring.177 The most cynical assessment of the lawyers’
incentives suggests that their best case scenario is an institutional plaintiff
with large enough common stock losses to win the lead plaintiff
appointment and therefore select them as lead counsel, followed by
disclosure and amendment of the claim to include derivatives that could
substantially increase the class’s damages while reducing the institution’s
stake in the outcome of the case. This reduced stake in the outcome would
reduce the institution’s incentive to monitor class counsel, undermining the
primary purpose of the lead plaintiff provision of the PSLRA. A more
benign view is that derivatives are difficult to cope with in litigation and
that the lawyers will deal with them if raised but will not include them on
their own. Because derivatives actually receive little scrutiny at the lead
plaintiff stage itself, few institutions are likely to actually bother assessing
their exposure in the first place. Such lack of attention to derivatives by
both lawyers and institutions may also be motivated by the fact that
derivatives trading may raise unique defenses affecting the typicality and
adequacy of derivatives traders, which is discussed in the next Part.
A reexamination of the statute offers limited hope for a solution. As
noted, the PSLRA creates a rebuttable presumption that the lead plaintiff is
whoever the court determines “has the largest financial interest in the relief
sought by the class.”178 One might argue that a lead plaintiff applicant’s
financial interest in the relief sought by the class may be broader than its
holdings in the particular security or securities enumerated in the complaint.
The unalleged ownership interest—e.g., derivatives or preferred stock in a
case in which the operative complaint only addresses common stock—
could still constitute a financial interest in the relief sought by the class
because the relief sought in the complaint would directly affect the
unalleged ownership stake. Therefore, a court could examine the applicant’s
176

See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Lead Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification at 9
n.6, In re Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n Sec., 503 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. May 18, 2006) (No. 04-1639)
(motioning to expand the class definition to include options traders).
177
See supra notes 49–55 and accompanying text.
178
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb) (2006) (emphasis added).

191

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

entire financial interest in all securities, even when selecting a lead plaintiff
for a case in which the operative complaint pleads only common stock.
This reading would solve the problem. But it is in tension with the
requirement that lead plaintiff applicants disclose their transactions “in the
security that is the subject of the complaint.”179 Implicitly, courts read
“relief sought” by the class as synonymous with relief “that is the subject of
the complaint.”180 Arguably, Congress would not authorize courts to broadly
examine a lead plaintiff applicant’s financial interest in the case but only
require disclosure of transactions actually named in the complaint. Perhaps
courts could simply order this disclosure on their own, reading the
disclosure provision as a floor rather than a ceiling.
Barring a rereading of the statute or congressional action, the legal
uncertainty surrounding derivatives in calculating the largest financial
interest is likely to persist. This uncertainty harms most investors, who may
be saddled with lead plaintiffs other than those who would be most
motivated to represent them. Individual investors are disproportionately
impacted by the unpredictability of derivatives treatment because they are
far less likely to engage in derivatives trading than are institutions.181 They
have no horse in the race but are expected to pay their pro rata share of legal
costs for it and run the risk, as class members, that their lead plaintiff or
lead counsel might be replaced because of it. Yet their comparative lack of
derivatives exposure makes them well-positioned to cure the problem.
Individual investors with no derivatives exposure may be selected lead
plaintiff with confidence that they have neither hidden gains nor hidden
offset losses and zero risk that those losses will appear later in the litigation
to significantly alter their monitoring incentives. The next Part further
explores the problem of unique defenses posed by derivatives trading, and
its disproportionate impact on individual investors.
b.

Derivatives Trading and the Challenge of Unique
Defenses.—Even assuming that a party’s derivatives trading
is incorporated into calculation of the largest financial interest, derivatives
traders may face another problem. They may be subject to typicality and
179

Id. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A)(iv) (emphasis added).
Lax v. First Merchs. Acceptance Corp., No. 97 C 2715, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11866, at *7,
22–23 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 6, 1997).
181
Compare Robert Dubil, Economic Derivatives Markets—New Opportunities for Individual
Investors: A Research Agenda, 16 FIN. SERVICES REV. 89, 91 (2007) (“Individual investors actively
participate in cash markets for stocks and bonds. . . . Of the 25-million brokerage accounts in the U.S.,
less than 5% have any option positions, and practically none have futures.”), with RENÉ M. STULZ,
DEMYSTIFYING FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES 8 (2006), available at http://www.cornerstone.com/files/
News/7fd495c7-8fac-4fa0-939d-0200b7819d8d/Presentation/NewsAttachment/d52f2901-b85b-4dfd80d6-0bfc1865d6c1/Cornerstone_Research_Demystifying_Financial_Derivatives.pdf (“60 percent of
[non-financial firms] use[] derivatives.”), and Thomas F. Siems, 10 Myths About Financial Derivatives,
CATO INST. (Sept. 11, 1997), http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-283.html (“[L]arge [multinational
corporations and banks] are the biggest users of derivative instruments.”).
180
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adequacy challenges because they are arguably subject to unique
defenses.182 These defenses relate to two elements of a traditional securities
fraud cause of action: (1) that the plaintiffs relied on the defendants’ false
and misleading statements and (2) that such reliance caused their injuries.183
Derivatives traders suing a defendant for fraud face two reliance
arguments that a defendant could not advance against a purchaser of stock
alone. The first is that traders who shorted the stock or otherwise hedged
against its rise could not have relied on the purportedly false and misleading
statements; only a purchaser or seller that assumed an increasing stock price
could have .184 Some courts have rejected derivatives-trading lead plaintiffs
on such grounds or required them to serve as lead plaintiffs of a separate
class of derivatives traders.185 The second, related reliance argument faced
by derivatives-trader plaintiffs is whether they can make use of the fraudon-the-market theory. The Supreme Court embraced the fraud-on-themarket theory in the landmark case of Basic Inc. v. Levinson.186 The theory
is based on the efficient market hypothesis, which essentially states that a
company’s stock price reflects all publicly available information about the
company.187 Thus, misleading statements about the company will defraud a
purchaser of stock trading in an efficient market even if the purchaser never
directly relied on the statements because they were reflected in the stock
182

See, e.g., Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d
176, 180 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[C]lass certification is inappropriate where a putative class representative is
subject to unique defenses which threaten to become the focus of the litigation.”); see also 5 JAMES WM.
MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.24[5] (3d ed. 2011).
183
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988).
184
See, e.g., In re Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. Sec. Litig., 571 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1330 (N.D. Ga. 2007)
(noting that a put option seller is not subject to unique defenses for class certification purposes because
the seller anticipates that stock price will stagnate or rise, like a stock purchaser); In re Priceline.com
Inc. Sec. Litig., 236 F.R.D. 89, 99 (D. Conn. 2006) (allowing the appointment as lead plaintiff of a
purchaser and holder of put options because he had testified that he assumed that the stock price would
increase); In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 139 F.R.D. 150, 155 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (finding the typicality
requirement of Rule 23 was met for lead plaintiff options traders “since the value of options is directly
related to the value of common stock”); Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 132 F.R.D. 359, 371 (D. Del.
1990) (describing how call option purchasers are similar to stock purchasers, unlike short sellers “who
profit when the market price decreases”); Moskowitz v. Lopp, 128 F.R.D. 624, 631 (E.D. Pa. 1989)
(noting that option traders may use the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance absent special
circumstances). But see Zlotnick v. TIE Commc’ns, 836 F.2d 818, 823 (3d Cir. 1988) (declining
presumption of reliance for short seller); Andrada v. Atherogenics, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 00061(RJH), 2005
WL 912359, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2005) (declining appointment of options trader as lead plaintiff
because of unique defenses).
185
See, e.g., Andrada, 2005 WL 912359, at *5 (finding an options holder is subject to unique
defenses); Weikel v. Tower Semiconducter Ltd., 183 F.R.D. 377, 391 (D.N.J. 1998) (rejecting
certification of options purchaser as class representative); Margolis v. Caterpillar, Inc., 815 F. Supp.
1150, 1156 (C.D. Ill. 1991) (ordering subclasses of options holders and stock holders). But see In re
Donkenny Inc. Sec. Litig., 171 F.R.D. 156, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding that options trader met
typicality and adequacy requirements).
186
485 U.S. 224 (1988).
187
See id. at 241–42 (defining fraud-on-the-market theory).

193

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

price when the purchase was made.188 The fraud-on-the-market theory
creates a presumption that any purchaser of the security relied on the false
and misleading statements simply by purchasing the security, since the
stock price would have reflected and incorporated those false and
misleading statements.189 The question of whether a derivatives trader can
rely upon the fraud-on-the-market theory has bedeviled courts; some have
concluded that derivatives traders may rely on the theory, others that they
may not.190 The inquiry is fact specific.191
Thus, appointment of an institutional class member as lead plaintiff
carries the risk that it will not have the desired motivation to monitor class
counsel because of hidden derivatives trading, as noted in Part II. It also
carries the risk that the institutions will be disqualified at the class
certification stage because of unique defenses raised by this trading. It is a
near certainty that the issue of whether the derivatives trader is typical and
adequate will have to be litigated, which incurs costs for the class even if
the initial lead plaintiff derivatives trader survives the class certification
stage as lead plaintiff. Moreover, because the courts that have ruled on the
issue are district courts192 and because the standard of review for such a
decision is abuse of discretion,193 there is no jurisdiction in which the issue
188

See id. (citing Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160–61 (3d Cir. 1986) (“Misleading statements
will therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the
misstatements.”)).
189
Id. at 247 (“[W]here materially misleading statements have been disseminated into an
impersonal, well-developed market for securities, the reliance of individual plaintiffs on the integrity of
the market price may be presumed.”).
190
Compare In re LDK Solar Sec. Litig., 255 F.R.D. 519, 532–33 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (denying that
lead plaintiff’s options trading prevented him from relying on the fraud-on-the-market theory), and
Montoya v. Herley Indus. Inc., No. 06-2596, 2006 WL 3337485, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2006) (citing
Argent Classic Convertible Arbitrage Fund L.P. v. Rite Aid Corp., 315 F. Supp. 2d 666, 676 (E.D. Pa.
2004)) (holding that lead plaintiff that shorted stock, but was net “long” the company, could maintain a
claim based on the fraud-on-the-market theory), and Crossen v. CV Therapeutics, No. C 03-03709, 2005
WL 1910928, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2005) (lead plaintiff seller of call options was not atypical of the
class and could rely on the fraud-on-the-market theory), with In re Critical Path, Inc. Sec. Litig., 156 F.
Supp. 2d 1102, 1109–10 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (disqualifying lead plaintiff applicant that shorted the
company’s stock because such a plaintiff could not rely upon the fraud-on-the-market theory), and In re
Bank One S’holders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780, 783 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (same).
191
See Levinson, 485 U.S. at 239 (1988) (explaining that the fraud-on-the-market theory of reliance
is a fact-specific inquiry because “no particular event or factor short of closing the transaction need be
either necessary or sufficient by itself”).
192
See, e.g., TCW Tech. Ltd. P’ship v. Intermedia Commc’ns, Inc., No. 18336, 2000 WL 1654504,
at *4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2000) (ruling on a lead plaintiff appointment).
193
See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 231 (3d Cir. 2001) (“We review the District
Court’s approval of a class action settlement, including its determination that the settlement was fair,
reasonable, and adequate, for abuse of discretion.”); Zeidman v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 651 F.2d
1030, 1038–39 (5th Cir. 1981) (“[T]he decision to certify a class action [is] left to the sound discretion
of the district court. Because certification of a class action has such great effect on the district court’s
control of litigation before it, and because certification involves substantial fact questions, we will not
reverse a district court’s decision on class certification absent an abuse of its discretion.”).
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is truly settled, leaving it open to be litigated in every securities case led by
an institution.
As argued below, appointment of an individual co-lead plaintiff who
did not engage in derivatives trading would improve the typicality and
adequacy of the lead plaintiff. It could allow the court to conclude that the
lead plaintiff group as a whole may rely on the fraud-on-the-market theory,
even if the court would not have allowed a derivatives-trading institution to
serve as a lead plaintiff alone. Or, should the court disqualify the
derivatives trading institutional lead plaintiff on typicality and adequacy
grounds, the continuity of the litigation may be preserved because the
individual lead plaintiff could remain as the lead, and, perhaps more
importantly for continuity purposes, the lead counsel selected by the
individual and institutional co-lead plaintiffs could remain in place with
little or no disruption.194
In sum, the fact that individual investors are much less likely to engage
in derivatives trading than are institutional investors means that, as lead
plaintiffs, they would expose the class to much less risk that their stake in
the outcome will change if derivatives are included. They also offer greater
stability to the lead plaintiff group because they will not be subject to the
unique defenses faced by derivatives traders.
2.

Holding Versus Selling Shareholder Plaintiffs.

a. Maximizing financial recovery.—In Gluck v. Cellstar Corp.,
the district court for the Northern District of Texas appointed an
institutional investor plaintiff with the largest loss as the lead plaintiff
despite a competing bid from a group including at least one individual
whose loss was substantial relative to the individual’s assets.195 The
competing group urged that it be appointed co-lead plaintiff with the
institution because the institution had traded in derivatives.196 The court held
that by expressing a preference for institutional investors, Congress had
preempted such typicality challenges based on derivatives trading.197 The
court appointed the institution as sole lead plaintiff.198 It could have stopped
there. But it offered an additional, revealing rationale for its holding. It
reasoned that plaintiffs with a small absolute investment in the defendant
company (and their lawyers) have strong incentives to seek the maximum
194

Courts could retain the same lead counsel even if they choose to replace the lead plaintiff, but
they might be more inclined to retain the original lead counsel when at least part of the original lead
plaintiff group remains.
195
976 F. Supp. 542, 545–46 (N.D. Tex. 1997); see HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF,
3C SEC & FED. CORP. L. § 16:146 (2d. ed 2004) (citing Gluck, 976 F. Supp. 542).
196
Gluck, 976 F. Supp. at 545.
197
Id. at 548 (“By expressing a strong preference for institutional investors to be Lead Plaintiffs,
Congress rejected typicality and adequacy objections like those of the CellStar Plaintiffs Group.”).
198
Id.

195

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

damage award possible without regard to future company performance or
share appreciation.199 Institutional investors—who the court assumed,
probably correctly, would continue to hold shares in the defendant company
after the fraud was revealed—would consider the long-term interests of the
defendant and would reduce “immediate damage payments to the plaintiff
class . . . [but] improve the chances that the company will experience future
growth.”200
The court’s rationale distorted the original intent of the PSLRA.
Congress reasoned that institutional investor lead plaintiffs were better class
representatives than professional plaintiffs who were incapable of
monitoring plaintiffs’ lawyers.201 Congress did not say, as the Gluck court
did,202 that the interests of investors who retained their shares in the
defendant company were a higher priority than those of individuals who sell
their shares because holding investors have the interests of the defendant in
mind. Here, the Gluck court elevated the legitimate interests of institutional
investors (long term growth of their ongoing investment in the defendant)
over the different but equally legitimate interests of individual investors (a
maximum damage award). In relying upon this rationale for its holding, the
court verbalized one of the key problems this Article seeks to address: in
consistently appointing institutional lead plaintiffs, regardless of how such
plaintiffs’ interests conflict with those of individual investors, courts de
facto prioritize the interests of institutional investors—and arguably, the
interests of defendants—over those of individual investors. That was never
Congress’s intention, and it runs afoul of Rule 23.
In Gluck, the elevation of institutional over individual interests
manifested itself in resolving a conflict that tends to break down along
institutional–individual lines: the conflict between holding and selling
shareholders of the defendant company.203 Even after a fraud is revealed,
institutional investors often hold some stake in the defendant company.204
199

Id.
Id.
201
S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 11 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690 (“Institutions with
large stakes in class actions have much the same interests as the plaintiff class generally; thus, courts
could be more confident settlements negotiated under the supervision of institutional plaintiffs were ‘fair
and reasonable’ than is the case with settlements negotiated by unsupervised plaintiffs’ attorneys.”
(quoting Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 1, at 2105)).
202
For an example of reasoning similar to the Gluck court, see Naiditch v. Applied Micro Circuits
Corp., No. 01-CV-0649-K-AJB, 2001 WL 1659115, at *2–3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2001) (citing Gluck and
appointing institutional investor as lead plaintiff despite institutional investor qualifying as a
professional plaintiff under the PSLRA). But see In re BP, PLC Sec. Litig., 758 F. Supp. 2d 428, 441–42
(S.D. Tex. 2010) (noting differences between plaintiffs and ultimately creating subclasses).
203
Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. REV.
1487, 1505 (1996) (pursuing meritorious litigation may not be in the best interests of continuing
shareholders).
204
Note that in order to have standing in a securities class action, a plaintiff must have purchased or
sold securities during the class period. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,
200
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They do so for two primary reasons: first, because their ownership stake is
substantial enough to further depress share prices if sold, causing even more
harm to them; second, because compliance with portfolio diversification
requirements hampers the funds’ ability to sell their positions even after a
fraud.205 On the other hand, individual shareholders whose buy–sell
decisions will have no impact on the share price frequently do sell after a
fraud.206 This may not be a rational decision, particularly if the market has
already priced in the harm of the fraud once it has been revealed. But it is
not per se irrational for individual investors to sell, as it often is for
institutions. Individual-investor stakes are not large enough to substantially
impact the stock price when they sell; therefore, they do not further harm
themselves through exit.
With no ongoing interest in the defendant issuer, selling shareholders
have a straightforward objective in the litigation: to maximize the damage
award. The incentives for holding shareholders are more complex. Holding
shareholders may be willing to forego some monetary compensation in
exchange for corporate governance reforms that would make their ongoing
investments in the company more valuable or simply to avoid damaging the
company in which they maintain an ongoing stake.207
The court in In re Cendant Corp. Litigation addressed this conflict,
noting the “attractive[ness]” of plaintiffs’ arguments that the lead plaintiff
California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) could not
747 (1975). A lead plaintiff may hold shares in the defendant that were purchased both before and
during the class period. Id. at 736. The pre-class period purchases would not count towards the
plaintiff’s damages. Id.
205
See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 244 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[A]n institutional
investor with enormous stakes in a company is highly unlikely to divest all of its holdings in that
company, even after a securities class action is filed in which it is a class member.”); In re Royal
Dutch/Shell Transp. Sec. Litig., 404 F. Supp. 2d 605, 611 (D.N.J. 2005) (“[B]ecause of the very size of
an institutional investor’s shareholdings, an institutional investor might be discouraged from divesting
itself of the stock.”); Mark R. Wingerson & Christopher H. Dorn, Institutional Investors in the U.S. and
the Repeal of Poison Pills: A Practitioner’s Perspective, 1992 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 223, 227
(“Institutional investors holding equity positions in the market generally diversify their holdings . . . .
Several factors contribute to this behavior: for example, pension funds are subject to prudence and
portfolio diversification requirements pursuant to the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA) . . . .”).
206
BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 195, § 16:146 (“The problem, however, is that a
substantial portion of the class are likely to have sold their stock soon after the bad news announcement
and will not benefit from improvement of the company’s future growth.”).
207
Cendant, 264 F.3d at 243 (noting that a lead plaintiff who retains a substantial investment faces
a conflict between trying to get maximum recovery for the class and trying to protect its ongoing
investment in the corporation “by settling cheap or by securing corporate governance changes in lieu of
cash”); Alexander, supra note 203, at 1504 (arguing that current investors would prefer that sanctions be
imposed on individuals responsible for the fraud rather than the company itself); Jill E. Fisch, Class
Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 533, 546 (1997) (“[A]n institution
that continues to own stock is poorly suited to represent investors who are no longer invested in the
company.”).
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adequately represent the class on account of its “huge” ongoing investment
in the defendant company because such an investment conflicted with
maximizing recovery for the class.208 As the Cendant court noted:
[A] rational Sell Plaintiff would be perfectly willing to push the defendant firm
one dollar short of declaring bankruptcy, [while] a rational Hold Plaintiff
rarely would be so willing because the increased value of her share of the
settlement fund would almost certainly be offset by a corresponding decrease
in the value of her stock.209

Still, despite acknowledging the conflict, the Cendant court declined to
disqualify CalPERS, concluding that Congress’s preference for institutional
lead plaintiffs implied that the conflict between sell and hold plaintiffs was
not per se disqualifying.210 But the Cendant court discussed its concerns
about the conflict in an extended footnote in which it called the issue to the
attention of district courts, noting that the conflict could raise class
certification issues and strongly implying that the creation of separate
subclasses of selling and holding plaintiffs would be an acceptable
remedy.211 The court also noted that the conflict was mutual: selling lead
plaintiffs might not adequately represent holding class members, just as
holding lead plaintiffs might not adequately represent selling class
members.212
Despite this clarion call from the Third Circuit, other courts have done
little about the conflict, avoiding creation of subclasses of sell and hold
plaintiffs while declining to disqualify holding institutional investors from
representing selling class members.213 What the Third Circuit acknowledged
as a conflict—albeit not a disqualifying one—has been read by some courts
as no conflict at all. For example, the court in In re Gemstar TV Guide
International, Inc. Securities Litigation declined to acknowledge any
conflict between selling and holding plaintiffs. The court first assumed that
“[e]very class member shares an overriding common interest in establishing
the existence and materiality of misrepresentations”214 (which may be true,
but which ignores the conflict over damages for such misrepresentations)
208

Cendant, 264 F.3d at 243.
Id. at 244 n.25.
210
Id. at 243–44.
211
Id. at 244 n.25 (“[T]he use of separate classes or sub-classes is not inconsistent with the Reform
Act because that statute deals with the identification of a lead plaintiff, and not with the proper means
for defining a class in the first place.”).
212
Id.
213
Westlaw and Lexis searches on November 11, 2011 revealed no cases in which courts created
subclasses of individual and institutional lead plaintiffs or disqualified institutional investors from
representing sell plaintiffs because of the sell–hold conflict. I used the following search terms: “subclass
/s(/p) “lead plaintiff” & conflict”, “subclass /s(/p) ‘sell plaintiff’ & institution!”, and “subclass! /p
institution! /p individ! & securities”.
214
209 F.R.D. 447, 453 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (alteration in original) (quoting Blackie v. Barrack, 524
F.2d 891, 910 (9th Cir. 1975)).
209
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and then cited caselaw supporting the proposition that there simply was no
such conflict in the case.215
Cendant and Gemstar TV suggest that courts have not adopted a
comprehensive approach to deal with the conflict between selling and
holding plaintiffs. This is a problem which remains particularly relevant for
individual investor members of the class, who almost exclusively suffer the
consequences. As the Cendant court pointed out, it is true that selling lead
plaintiffs are no more or less adequate as representatives of holding
shareholders and vice versa.216 But the reality is that cases in which
individuals find themselves appointed lead plaintiff are likely to be ones in
which institutional investors have incurred losses in such trivial amounts
(on a relative or absolute basis) that they are virtually indifferent to the
outcome of the case; otherwise, an institution would likely have obtained
the lead plaintiff appointment because of their larger stakes in the
defendant, on average. The conflict usually manifests with institutional
plaintiffs who maintain an ongoing stake in the defendant representing
selling individual shareholders.
In sum, the preference for institutional investor lead plaintiffs
inherently favors hold plaintiffs over sell plaintiffs, raising Rule 23
concerns that can be solved by appointment of an individual co-lead
plaintiff.
b. Corporate Governance Reform.—The corporate governance
reform movement—a broad phrase used to describe efforts by shareholders
to reform the rules and norms by which corporations are operated—has
blossomed in recent years, particularly since the collapses of Enron and
WorldCom.217 Institutional investors have led this movement; union and
public pension funds have actively participated, striving to increase the
voice of shareholders in corporate governance and improve supervision of
senior management through independent board members.218 Institutional
215

Id. (citing In re AST Research Sec. Litig., No. CV 94-1370 SVW, 1994 WL 722888, at *4–5
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 1994) (the Ninth Circuit has “rejected contentions that the interests of in/out traders
can prevent certification of a class” that includes “retention plaintiffs”)); In re Unioil Sec. Litig., 107
F.R.D. 615, 621–22 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (finding no conflict between retention purchasers and “in-and-out”
traders); 7 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 22.39, at 198 (4th ed. 2002) (“[A] plaintiff who has acquired
and retained securities can thoroughly and adequately represent parties who purchased securities and
then sold them, and vice versa.” (citations omitted)).
216
Cendant, 264 F.3d at 244 n.25 (“[N]oting the possibility of a significant conflict in many
securities class actions between the interests of individuals and institutions that purchased and then sold
stock in the defendant firm—‘Sell Plaintiffs’—and those who bought and continue to hold such stock—
‘Hold Plaintiffs.’” (citing In re Party City Sec. Litig., 189 F.R.D. 91, 108–10 (D.N.J. 1999))).
217
See Sherrie R. Savett, Plaintiff’s Vision of Securities Litigation: Trends/Strategies in 2005-2007,
in SECURITIES LITIGATION & ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 2007, at 57, 65 (2007) (noting “improved
corporate governance in the wake of the Enron and WorldCom debacles”).
218
The Council of Institutional Investors (CII) is a nonprofit association of public, union, and
corporate pension funds with combined assets that exceed $3 trillion. Its corporate governance policies

199

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

investors have experienced some success promoting say-on-pay initiatives,
majority voting for election of directors, shareholder proxy access, and
adoption of an independent board chairman.219 The recent incorporation of
proxy access into Dodd–Frank is a legislative triumph for shareholder rights
that is largely attributable to the efforts of these institutions (although the
SEC’s proposed implementation of proxy access via Rule 14a-11 was
recently struck down by the D.C. Circuit).220 Still, even if a revised form of
proxy access ultimately passes legal scrutiny, it remains to be seen whether
certain restrictions placed on this access will result in de facto
inaccessibility of the proxy for shareholders.221
All investors, including individual investors, have benefited from these
reforms. Academic research has shown that firms with stronger shareholder
rights had higher firm value, higher profits, higher sales growth, lower
are a useful example of the corporate governance objectives that institutional investors have pursued
over the past twenty years. For example, the council maintains policies with regard to the company
board of directors, shareholder voting rights, shareholder meetings, executive compensation, director
compensation, and the definition of an independent director. See History, COUNCIL INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS, http://www.cii.org/history (last visited Mar. 24, 2012); Corporate Governance Policies,
COUNCIL INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/CII%20Corp%20Gov%20
Policies%20Full%20and%20Current%2009-29-10%20final.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2012).
219
See Louis M. Thompson, Jr., The Individual Investor as Potential “Swing” Voter, COMPLIANCE
WK., June 2007, at 70.
220
Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
221
Under the Dodd–Frank Act, the SEC had authority to promulgate rules regarding shareholder
proxy access. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 971, 124 Stat. 1376, 1915 (2010) (authorizing the SEC to promulgate rules regarding proxy access).
Pursuant to this authority, the SEC established Rule 14a-11 which allowed a shareholder group holding
at least 3% of total voting power to access management proxies and nominate up to 25% of the board,
gaining additional benefits and voice. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Release Nos.
33-9136, 34-62764, IC-29384, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,782–87 (Sept. 16, 2010). This proxy access
regulation was then challenged by the Business Roundtable and U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and
vacated by the D.C. Circuit. See Gordon Smith, Business Roundtable v. SEC, CONGLOMERATE (July 22,
2011), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2011/07/business-roundtable-v-sec.html. Although the rule was
struck down, the 3% requirement exemplifies a restriction that would put proxy access beyond the reach
of most shareholders. See, e.g., Ted Allen, Three More Proxy Access Proposals Filed, ISS (Dec. 1,
2011, 3:31 PM), http://blog.issgovernance.com/gov/2011/12/three-more-proxy-acess-proposalsfiled.html (“[T]he SEC’s universal access rule (Rule 14a-11) . . . would have required investor groups to
hold a 3 percent stake for at least three years, and imposed a 25 percent cap on the board seats that could
be contested by access nominees. That rule was overturned by a federal appeals court in July and the
SEC appears unlikely to try to revive that rule in the coming year. While some institutional investors
have expressed support for Rule 14a-11’s thresholds, . . . retail activists have argued that those hurdles
would be too high and would bar small shareowners from nominating board candidates.”).
Comparatively, investors must disclose the beneficial ownership of 5% or more of shares outstanding
under Exchange Act Rule 13(d). 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (2006). Although only 2% higher, this threshold
was enacted to “alert the marketplace to every large, rapid aggregation or accumulation of
securities . . . which might represent a potential shift in corporate control.” GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453
F.2d 709, 717 (2d Cir. 1971); accord Amendments to Beneficial Ownership Reporting Requirements,
Release No. 34-39538, 63 Fed. Reg. 2854, 2584 (Jan. 16, 1998) (noting that the 5% trigger alerts
investors to the actions of large shareholders).
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capital expenditures, and fewer corporate acquisitions.222 An investment
strategy that bought firms with the strongest shareholder rights and sold
those with the weakest rights would have earned abnormal returns of 8.5%
per year during the sample period.223 All of the top shareholder plaintiffs’
law firms tout their successes in obtaining corporate governance reform on
behalf of institutional clients.224
Actual corporate governance activism manifests itself in two basic
forms: nonlitigation activism and litigation activism.225 Nonlitigation
activism includes a broad range of activities such as writing a letter to
management or a comment letter to the SEC, participating in proxy contests
in support of nonmanagement board nominees, withholding votes from a
management director candidate, or lobbying state legislatures with respect
to corporate governance.226 Litigation activism mostly includes serving as a
lead plaintiff in a securities class action.227 While serving as a lead plaintiff
may itself be viewed as a form of corporate governance activism, how an

222

See generally Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate
Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783, 813 (2009) (“Firms with a low [shareholder-friendly] E Index
score are associated with statistically significant abnormal returns both during the 1990–1999
period . . . and the longer 1999–2003 time period . . . .”); Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick,
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q. J. ECON. 107, 119–21 (2003) (noting that strong
shareholder rights are “positively correlated with size, share price, trading volume, and institutional
ownership”).
223
Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, supra note 222, at 109, 122.
224
See, e.g., Corporate Governance and Reform, BARRACK, RODOS & BACINE,
http://www.barrack.com/Corporate-Governance-and-Reform.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2012)
(providing examples of the types of corporate governance reforms attained by the firm); Corporate
Governance Reforms, BERNSTEIN LIEBHARD LLP, http://www.bernlieb.com/results/CorporateGovernance-Reforms/index.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2012) (noting firm’s “particular success using
litigation to accomplish corporate governance improvements for shareholders”); Leadership in
Corporate Governance Reforms, BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMANN LLP,
http://www.blbglaw.com/our_record_results/leadership_corp_gov (last visited Mar. 24, 2012) (touting
firm as “among the first law firms to ever obtain meaningful corporate governance reforms through
securities litigation”); Corporate Governance, KESSLER TOPAZ METZLER CHECK LLP,
http://www.ktmc.com/investors_governance.php (last visited Mar. 24, 2012) (noting the firm’s belief
that “litigation can be used not only as a means to recover monetary losses, but also as a vehicle to
implement corporate governance reform”); Corporate Governance, LABATON SUCHAROW,
http://www.labaton.com/en/practiceareas/Corporate-Governance.cfm (last visited Mar. 24, 2012)
(stating that the firm “has been leading corporate governance reform efforts for more than a decade”);
Corporate Governance Principles, MILBERG LLP, http://www.milberg.com/rigorous-corporategovernance-principles-institutional-investors (last visited Mar. 24, 2012) (“Milberg’s work with
institutional clients is based on the premise that good corporate governance is critical to the protection of
shareholder assets and the sustainability of a corporation.”); Corporate Governance, ROBBINS GELLER
RUDMAN & ROBBINS LLP, http://www.rgrdlaw.com/services-institutional-investor-corporategovernance-reform.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2012) (noting firm’s corporate governance achievements).
225
Choi & Fisch, supra note 48, at 326–32 (describing corporate governance activism).
226
Id. at 326–29.
227
Id. at 330–31.
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institution performs in that role is a function of how much it prioritizes
corporate governance reform.
A securities fraud class action offers the shareholder class, and in
particular the lead plaintiff, a unique opportunity to demand corporate
governance reform from the issuer defendant.228 With the corporation
reeling from a publicly disclosed fraud, sharp investor losses, negative press
coverage, and a breakdown in the corporation’s self-policing mechanisms
designed to root out the fraud in the first place, it is often eager to make at
least cosmetic and hopefully substantive reforms designed to restore
investor confidence and prevent renewed abuses.229 Institutional investors
have successfully utilized their positions as lead plaintiffs to obtain such
reforms. For example, in their capacity as lead plaintiffs in the
UnitedHealth Group shareholder litigation—the largest ever stock options
backdating case—CalPERS and the Alaska Plumbing and Pipefitting
Industry Pension Trust obtained a $925 million recovery (minus costs) and
substantial corporate governance reforms.230 These reforms included “a
process for election of a shareowner-nominated director, enhanced
standards for director independence, a mandated holding period for option
shares acquired by executives, shareowner approval of any stock option repricing, and that incentive compensation take into consideration
UnitedHealth’s performance as compared to its peer group.”231 Current and
future shareholders likely benefited from such reforms, but selling
shareholders did not. Unless one assumes that UnitedHealth agreed to these
corporate governance reforms in exchange for nothing, it follows that the
reforms were obtained in exchange for a reduction in compensation for the
shareholder class.232
228

See, e.g., Todd Henderson, Governance at Gunpoint, U. CHI. L. SCH. FAC. BLOG (Sept. 12,
2006, 11:26 AM), http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2006/09/governance_at_g.html (noting the
merits of governance reform through litigation and deliberation).
229
See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 247 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating defendant issuer
may have agreed to corporate governance changes “as a way to show investors that it was addressing the
situation that allowed the fraud to occur in the first place, thus trying to make itself more attractive”).
230
See Notice of Pendency and Settlement of Class Action, Exhibit A1 at 15–16, In re
UnitedHealth Grp. Inc. PSLRA Litig., No. 0:06-CV-01691-JMR-FLN (D. Minn. Dec. 22, 2008);
UnitedHealth Group Agrees to Resolve Federal Securities Class Action Lawsuit, UNITEDHEALTH GRP.
(July 2, 2008), http://www.unitedhealthgroup.com/newsroom/news.aspx?id=92f1c380-fcfc-4228-85bf9b6ffdd11921.
231
Press Release, CalPERS, CalPERS, UnitedHealth Group Reach $895 Million Settlement in
Class-Action Case—Includes Landmark Corporate Governance Reforms (July 2, 2008), available at
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/about/press/pr-archive/pr-2008/jul/unitedhealth-reachsettlement.xml.
232
Cf. Cendant, 264 F.3d at 219, 246–47 (noting objector’s grievance that the lead plaintiff
negotiated a settlement including corporate governance changes that would only benefit class members
that continued to hold Cendant stock after revelation of the fraud, and ultimately rejecting the objection
because the objector failed to present evidence that corporate governance reform was exchanged for
reduced compensation).
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In addition to raising concerns about the compensation of sell
plaintiffs, the tradeoff between compensation and corporate governance
reform raises concerns about another threshold purpose of securities class
actions: deterrence of fraud.233 In theory, the purpose of securities class
actions is not only to compensate investors for their losses, but to punish the
perpetrators of the fraud in the hopes that such punishment will deter other
actors from engaging in it.234 Deterrence is attained when the individual
perpetrators of the fraud and the corporation itself are forced to pay a price
that leaves the perpetrators worse off financially than they were prior to the
fraud.235 Such deterrence discourages individuals from committing fraud
and incentivizes the corporate defendant to institute methods and
procedures for preventing the fraud in the first place.236
While corporate governance reform is admirable to the extent it
improves company value and helps prevent and detect future frauds, when it
is being exchanged for lower damages payments it may not only be unfair
to sell plaintiffs but may raise concerns about underdeterrence. First,
corporate governance reform that halts ongoing fraud and enhances the
detection of future fraud only ensures that defendants must stop the scheme.
Securities litigation is supposed to be a deterrent, not an amnesty
program.237 Second, not all corporate governance reforms arising from
securities litigation directly target the fraud itself.238 Some enhance
shareholder value in other ways. For example, increasing oversight by the
audit committee might directly enhance fraud detection and deterrence, but
shifting from staggered to annually elected boards of directors would seem
to have at most a tenuous connection to fraud and thus little deterrent effect.
Moreover, while holding shareholders, even individual holding
shareholders, may benefit from corporate governance improvements,
institutional shareholders disproportionately benefit from such
improvements. For example, as noted in the UnitedHealth litigation
mentioned above, it is not uncommon for lead plaintiff institutions to seek
233

John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its
Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1545–48 (2006) (discussing compensatory and deterrence
rationales).
234
See id. at 1547 (“But if the securities class action fails as a mechanism for compensation, it can
still perform admirably as a form of deterrence.”).
235
See id. at 1548 (“In principle, if insiders face an expected penalty that exceeds their expected
gain, this should be sufficient to remove any incentive for them to inflate the corporation’s stock
price.”).
236
In practice, optimal deterrence is rarely obtained in securities class actions. In particular, the
deterrence function is often inhibited because settlements are often paid by directors’ and officers’
liability insurers and not by the perpetrators personally. See, e.g., id. at 1567–70 (discussing the way in
which officer insurance and indemnification negatively affect the deterrence function).
237
See id. at 1547.
238
See Press Release, CalPERS, supra note 231 (including “incentive compensation [that] take[s]
into consideration UnitedHealth’s performance” among the listed corporate governance reforms).
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the establishment of a shareowner nominating committee for director
elections.239 Typically such committees are comprised of shareholders who
own some minimal threshold of the company’s stock, usually enough to
ensure that they will be institutional investors.240 Such investors may find
themselves appointed to the committee. While all investors likely benefit
from an increased shareholder voice within the corporate management
structure, the institutions that actually obtain a seat on such committees
disproportionately benefit and therefore may be inclined to trade monetary
compensation in exchange for such reform. As argued below, appointment
of an individual seller as co-lead plaintiff would embed a voice for
maximizing recovery within the lead plaintiff structure and push the balance
of protected interests back towards the underrepresented individual sell
plaintiffs.
3.

Mergers and Acquisitions: Institutional Investors with Equity in
Both the Target and the Bidder.—In state-level transactional class
actions, the bulk of which historically took place in Delaware,241 the
plaintiff shareholder class generally brings an action alleging that the
company’s board failed to obtain a sufficient price for the company’s shares
in a friendly merger or other fundamental corporate transaction, or failed to
respond adequately to a hostile bid.242 Such cases may also allege that a
controlling shareholder violated its fiduciary duties to minority shareholders
by “cash[ing] out the minority at an unfair price, or through unfair
dealings.”243 They may allege self-dealing by management either in
management buyouts or sales to a friendly third party.244 Class actions may
also arise in hostile bidder or second bidder situations (when a second
239

See id.
See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 971,
124 Stat. 1376, 1915 (2010) (authorizing the SEC to promulgate rules regarding proxy access);
Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Release Nos. 33-9136, 34-62764, IC-29384, 75 Fed.
Reg. 56,668, 56,782–87 (Sept. 16, 2010) (allowing a shareholder group holding at least 3% of total
voting power to access management proxies and nominate up to 25% of the board, gaining additional
benefits and voice).
241
See e.g., John Armour, Bernard S. Black and Brian Cheffins, Delaware’s Balancing Act 1 (Nw.
Univ. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 10-04, July 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1677400 (stating shareholder lawsuits against Delaware corporations have historically been
filed in Delaware). But see John Armour, Bernard S. Black and Brian R. Cheffins, Is Delaware Losing
Its Cases? 5 (Nw. Univ. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 10-03, Mar. 25, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1578404 (noting the recent trend away from corporate law litigation in the
Delaware Court of Chancery).
242
Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation:
Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 173–75 (2004) (analyzing acquisition cases
including friendly, hostile, arm’s length, and control-shareholder transactions).
243
Id. at 173–74 (finding it especially likely when the controlling shareholder owns more than 50%
of the company).
244
Id. at 174 (“The MBO cases raise conflict-of-interest claims because of the potential for the
target company’s board of directors to give its managers special preferences in a sale of control.”).
240
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bidder emerges after management has announced a friendly acquisition
deal).245
The process of selecting transactional lead plaintiffs in Delaware is
similar, but not identical, to the federal process under the PSLRA. Delaware
judges assess: (1) “the ‘quality of the pleading’ that appears best able to
represent the interests of the shareholder class and derivative plaintiffs;” (2)
“the relative economic stakes of the competing litigants in the outcome of
the lawsuit (to be accorded ‘great weight’);” (3) “the willingness and ability
of all the contestants to litigate vigorously on behalf of an entire class of
shareholders;” (4) “the absence of any conflict between larger, often
institutional, stockholders and smaller stockholders;” (5) “the enthusiasm
or vigor with which the various contestants have prosecuted the lawsuit;”
and (6) “competence of counsel and their access to the resources necessary
to prosecute the claims at issue.”246 TCW Technology Ltd. Partnership v.
Intermedia Communications, Inc. established this standard for selecting
lead plaintiffs, formulating the economic stakes test as one that evaluated
the “greatest economic stake in the outcome of the lawsuit.”247 In so doing,
the TCW Technology court noted that this test “give[s] recognition to large
shareholders or significant institutional investors who are willing to litigate
vigorously on behalf of an entire class of shareholders, provided no
economic or other conflicts exist between the institutional shareholder and
smaller, more typical shareholders.”248 Approximately 40% of all
transactional class actions that have been filed in Delaware since TCW
Technology have been led by institutional investors.249
State-level transactional class actions present yet another forum for the
tensions between institutional and individual investors. Institutional
investors hold billions of dollars in diversified assets. Consequently, they
will often own shares in both the bidder and target companies.250 This
presents potential conflicts, particularly in the context of a change-incontrol transaction in which the target board is obligated to maximize the
price for target shareholders.251 As a lead plaintiff, an institutional investor
245

Id. (noting that hostile-bidder situations make up only about 10% of acquisition litigation).
Wiehl v. Eon Labs, No. Civ.A. 1116-N, 2005 WL 696764, at *1–2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 22, 2005)
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
247
TCW Tech. Ltd. P’ship v. Intermedia Commc’ns, Inc., No. 18336, 2000 WL 1654504, at *4
(Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2000).
248
Id. (establishing standard for selection of lead plaintiffs favoring institutional investors similar to
PSLRA) (emphasis added).
249
Webber, supra note 7, at 7–8.
250
Miguel A. Ferreira, Massimo Massa & Pedro Matos, Shareholders at the Gate? Institutional
Investors and Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 601, 638 (2010) (stating that
some institutional investors hold both target and bidder shares).
251
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986)
(beginning a line of cases enforcing a duty to get the best price for the shareholders once the company is
up for sale).
246
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should typify the class of target shareholders and zealously advocate on
their behalf.252 The institution must strive to maximize the price paid for the
class’s shares by the acquirer, augment disclosures, and create an open
bidding process in the hope that the class will benefit from a bidding war.253
But as shareholders in the acquiring company, institutional investors’
interests may run counter to these objectives. The dollars they win as
members of the target class are dollars they lose as an acquirer shareholder,
and vice versa. If the institutional investors’ stake in the acquirer is greater
than their stake in the target, their net financial incentive is to lower the
bidding price, not increase it. Moreover, where more than one bidder or
potential bidder exists for the target, an institutional lead plaintiff with
ownership stakes in these bidders or potential bidders might seek remedies
that either expand or restrict the bidding process. The institution might take
into account its ownership stake in the bidders rather than focusing solely
on its ownership stake in the target.
This conflict has been raised in the Delaware Chancery Court. For
example, in a recently filed brief in Police & Fire Retirement System of the
City of Detroit v. Yahoo! Inc., a competing lead plaintiff challenged the
Police and Fire Retirement System of the City of Detroit’s (Detroit P&F)
application for appointment as lead plaintiff in a shareholder class action
brought against Yahoo!’s board.254 Yahoo!’s shareholders claimed that the
board breached its fiduciary duties by rejecting Microsoft’s offer to pay a
62% premium for Yahoo!’s shares.255 The Plumbers and Pipefitters Local
Union No. 630 Pension–Annuity Trust Fund (P&P) argued that Detroit
P&F should be disqualified as the lead plaintiff representing Yahoo!’s
shareholders because it also owned shares in Microsoft.256 In defense of its
application, Detroit P&F responded that the court had never held “that a
proposed representative plaintiff is subject to disqualification due to an
equity interest in a potential acquirer.”257 It further argued that adopting
such a rule would “exclude every multi-billion dollar investment fund from

252

DEL. CH. CT. R. 23(a)(3)–(4), available at http://courts.delaware.gov/forms/
download.aspx?=39138.
253
See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 185 (creating a duty for the board to get the best possible price for the
shareholders once the company is up for sale); see also Kahn v. Lynch Commc’ns Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d
1110, 1120–21 (Del. 1994) (regarding duties of a controlling shareholder); Barkan v. Amsted Indus.,
Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989) (reinforcing the Revlon duty via auction).
254
Memorandum of Law in Further Support of the Detroit Funds’ Motion for Consolidation,
Appointment of Lead Counsel and in Opposition to the Plumbers & Pipefitters Competing Motion at 1,
Police & Fire Ret. Sys. of Detroit v. Yahoo! Inc., No. 3561, 2008 WL 2213692, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 3,
2008) [hereinafter Memorandum of Law].
255
See Aaron ex rel. Yahoo! Inc. v. Yang, No. C-08-05438 RMW, 2009 WL 1689707, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. June 15, 2009), aff’d sub nom. Congregation Beth Aaron ex rel. Yahoo! Inc. v. Yang, 400 Fed.
App’x 252 (9th Cir. 2010).
256
Memorandum of Law, supra note 254, at 1.
257
Id. at 1.
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participating” in litigation in Delaware cases involving two or more public
companies.258 The court appointed Detroit P&F lead plaintiff without
commenting on the conflict.259 There is nothing in the record indicating that
the court required disclosure of Detroit P&F’s stake in Microsoft. Without
such disclosure, it is difficult to discern how one could assess whether there
was “any conflict between larger, often institutional, stockholders and
smaller stockholders.”260
As Detroit P&F pointed out, because of broad shareholdings by
institutional investors, a per se rule barring investors that maintain an equity
position in a bidder would de facto disqualify institutions from serving as
lead plaintiffs.261 But intermediate positions exist between barring such
investors from serving as lead plaintiffs and ignoring the conflicts they
present. For example, one seemingly straightforward solution might be to
require institutional investors to disclose their stakes in actual bidders—
e.g., Detroit P&F disclosing its shares in Microsoft. From this, a simple
calculation would follow (subject to the complexities of calculating
derivatives exposure). What is the lead plaintiff applicant’s financial
interest in the bidder relative to the target? An institution whose financial
interest in the bidder exceeds its interest in the target should simply be
barred from serving as the lead plaintiff because its financial interests
directly conflict with those of the class. One would hope that an
institutional lead plaintiff that finds itself in this situation would not seek a
lead plaintiff appointment that would be against its own interests and
thereby create a conflict between the fund’s duties to its beneficiaries and
its duties to the shareholder class as lead plaintiff.
It is worth pausing here to investigate why a fund might ever seek a
lead plaintiff appointment to represent a class of shareholders with whom
the fund’s interests are in direct conflict. The reasons range from the sinister
to the merely negligent. One reason could be that the board members of the
fund retain some private benefit from bringing the litigation even if the suit
runs counter to the fund’s interests. For example, politicians serving on a
fund’s board might win favorable publicity by using the fund’s lead
plaintiff status to win concessions from the bidder in favor of the target,
particularly if the target is located within the politician’s constituency and
employs voters. Politicians might also bring an action if they have received
a campaign contribution from the plaintiffs’ lawyers interested in bringing
the case, although recent empirical work suggests these concerns are
258

Id. at 1–2.
See Police & Fire Ret. Sys. of Detroit v. Yahoo! Inc., No. 3561 (Del. Ch. Mar. 5, 2008),
available
at
http://www.blbglaw.com/cases/00071_data/Yahoo-SignedOrderofCons.03-05-08.pdf
(consolidating three cases and appointing Detroit P&F as lead plaintiff).
260
Hirt v. U.S. Timberlands Serv. Co., No. Civ.A. 19575, 2002 WL 1558342, at *2 (Del. Ch. July
3, 2002).
261
Memorandum of Law, supra note 254, at 1.
259
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overblown.262 On the more sinister end of the spectrum—in what is an
admittedly improbable but still possible scenario—an institutional investor
could obtain lead plaintiff status for the purpose of thwarting the litigation.
This would be a blatant violation of the fund’s fiduciary duty to the class of
shareholders it is supposed to represent. Nevertheless, with no required
disclosure of the fund’s holdings in the bidder, the risk of exposure would
seem low, and if the stakes were high enough for the institutional investor,
it might conclude on a cost–benefit basis that obtaining the lead plaintiff
appointment would be worth the risk. Investors have exhibited similarly
mercenary behavior in the realm of empty voting, in which investors with
no financial interest in a bidder, but with a voting interest, campaign for the
bidder to pay maximum price for the target company in which the
investor’s true financial interest actually lies.263 In the empty-voting
scenario, the investor voting in favor of the high price deceptively appears
to have the same interests as its fellow investors, when in fact their interests
are opposed.264 In the empty-voting scenario, though, the investor owes no
duty to its fellow investors,265 whereas a fund that obtained a lead plaintiff
appointment would owe a fiduciary duty to fellow investors as class
representative.266 The mere existence of the duty would presumably make
the lead plaintiff scenario less likely than the empty-voting scenario, but
many cases settle with no change in the offer price and a handful of
relatively meaningless disclosures of little material interest to shareholders.
The mere presence of an unattractive settlement for the target’s
shareholders is unlikely to raise suspicions about a lead plaintiff willfully
underlitigating a case.
Another more benign but nevertheless troubling reason why a fund
would seek to represent a class of target shareholders when its ownership
stake in the bidder or bidders exceeds its stake in the target is simple
negligence. The fund may not examine its ownership stake in the bidder or
bidders because it does not have to. There have been prior examples of such
262

Webber, supra note 96, at 2080 (“[P]oliticians and political control negatively correlate with
lead plaintiff appointments in securities class actions.”).
263
See Hu & Black, supra note 13, at 830 (“Empty voting on the acquirer’s side by the target’s
shareholders, employed if the vote is likely to be close, could reduce whatever constraint the vote
requirement now instills on the acquiring firm.”); Shaun P. Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered
Shares 34 (Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No.
05-23, Oct. 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=621323 (“[M]illions of target shares . . . come to
be owned by encumbered shareholders with a single incentive: to ensure that the deal is approved,
regardless of its merits.”).
264
See Hu & Black, supra note 13, at 894 (suggesting that such empty voting would constitute the
same breach of fiduciary duties as classic vote buying).
265
Id. at 893–95 (finding no duty between investors).
266
7 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 22:5, at 37 (4th ed. 2002) (“The lead plaintiff owes a
fiduciary duty to all members of the proposed class to provide fair and adequate representation and
actively to work with class counsel to obtain the largest recovery for the proposed class consistent with
good faith and meritorious advocacy.”).
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negligence on the part of funds.267 As in the “thwarting” example above,
such negligence might also constitute a breach of fiduciary duty to the class,
or to the institution’s own shareholders or beneficiaries.
Even in the most typical scenario, where an institution whose interest
in the target exceeds its interest in the bidder and thus benefits from
increasing the share price, the institution’s incentives are neither as strong
nor as pure as a shareholder invested only in the target. The institution will
still be protective of its ongoing investment in the bidder. Here, an
institutional lead plaintiff bears a closer resemblance to the institutional
“holding” lead plaintiff in a PSLRA suit, presenting similar conflicts of
interest that can hamper the interests of the entire class.
A simple procedure to remedy these conflicts follows from this basic
example. The court should calculate a lead plaintiff’s actual financial
interest by subtracting its holdings in the bidder from its holdings in the
target. Thus, if institution A maintains a $10 million investment in the target
and a $5 million investment in the bidder, its financial interest is $5 million.
If institution B invests $7 million in the target and $1 million in the bidder,
its financial interest is $6 million. If institution C invests $12 million in the
target and $15 million in the bidder, its financial interest is -$3 million.
Under current Delaware practice, the preferred lead plaintiff would be
institution C.268 Under the proposal here, institution B should be selected.269
While this procedure is straightforward in the situation of a target with
one bidder (again, subject to the complexities of derivatives exposure), it
becomes more complex when multiple bidders are involved. In that case,
the institutional lead plaintiffs’ interests may vary substantially depending
on the bidder: Institution A may have a $5 million stake in one bidder and a
$1 million stake in another. A further degree of complexity is added if one
includes potential bidders—bidders who have expressed some interest but
have not made a bid or may otherwise be obvious bidders for the target.
267

See, e.g., Cox & Thomas, supra note 85, at 412 (finding that large financial institutions
frequently do not make claims on money owed from class action litigation).
268
See TCW Tech. Ltd. P’ship v. Intermedia Commc’ns, Inc., No. 18336, 2000 WL 1654504, at *4
(Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2000) (“[T]he Court should give weight to the shareholder plaintiff that has the
greatest economic stake in the outcome of the lawsuit.”).
269
Institution B might also offer more benefit to the class than an institution with the same financial
interest—$6 million—but no investment in the bidder. For example, one of the chief complaints in statelevel transactional litigation is that the target board has exchanged its approval and recommendation of
the merger for seats on the board of the bidder or the post-merger entity. See, e.g., In re Atlas Energy
Res., LLC, Unitholder Litig., No. 4589-VCN, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 216, at *46–47 (Del. Ch. Oct. 28,
2010) (attacking the independence of a target company’s board members on the grounds that they were
promised seats on the board of the surviving company); Krim v. ProNet, Inc., 744 A.2d 523, 525 (Del.
Ch. 1999) (asserting that the target board breached its duty of loyalty in approving a merger because
several directors would receive seats on the acquirer board if the merger were finalized). A significant
shareholder in the bidder would have some leverage to maximize price or open up the process to other
bidders or at least put pressure on the bidder to disclose its financial arrangements with target directors
or officers.
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Without analyzing every possible permutation, it is clear that there is a
point of diminishing returns to this inquiry when its complexity and
inconvenience could outweigh its benefits in producing a conflict-free lead
plaintiff. In such circumstances, the court should use its discretion to
fashion a solution that is suitable to the particular case, whether that be a
group of lead plaintiffs or the selection of the lead plaintiff with the largest
net financial interest at the time of application, regardless of what bidders
may subsequently step forward. Still, the potential complexity of such an
inquiry should not lead courts to avoid it altogether. In many instances the
inquiry will not be complex at all.
As is discussed below, appointment of an individual co-lead plaintiff
who is invested only in the target would significantly improve the typicality
and adequacy of the lead plaintiff group.
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO CONFLICTS BETWEEN INSTITUTIONAL AND
INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS
The conflicts outlined above place federal district court judges in a
bind, caught between two competing congressional commands: (1) to
appoint an institutional investor lead plaintiff and (2) to abide by Rule 23.270
This Article argues that, in practice, courts have followed the first command
at the expense of the second. The best way for federal district judges to
harmonize both commands is to appoint a qualified individual investor as
co-lead plaintiff with an institutional investor. Judges should only opt for
subclasses on motion from one of the co-lead plaintiffs in the unlikely event
that the co-leads simply cannot agree about what is in the best interests of
the class they represent. This same solution applies to Delaware Chancery
Court judges and indeed any state court system which articulates a
preference for institutional investor lead plaintiffs. Such judges are
similarly caught between this preference and state versions of Rule 23.
A. Appointment of an Individual Co-lead Plaintiff with an Institutional
Lead Plaintiff
The PSLRA grants courts the authority to appoint as lead plaintiff a
“person or group of persons.”271 Such authority has been used to appoint
small lead plaintiff groups that jointly apply for the job.272 It has also been
270

See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I) (2006) (creating the “most adequate plaintiff”
rule that favors institutional investors); H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 34 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 733 (noting that Congress “intend[ed] that the lead plaintiff provision will
encourage institutional investors to take a more active role in securities class action lawsuits”).
271
§ 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I); see also In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 42, 49
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (noting that the PSLRA “expressly contemplates the appointment of more than one
plaintiff”).
272
See, e.g., Johnson v. Pozen Inc., No. 1:07CV599, 2008 WL 474334, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 15,
2008) (appointing an individual and a fund as co-lead plaintiffs to provide diversity in representation).
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used to join separate applicants as co-lead plaintiffs.273 Delaware courts
have similarly appointed lead plaintiff groups consisting of both coapplicants and competing applicants.274 I have found some instances in
which courts have appointed individual and institutional co-lead plaintiffs
with the explicit goal of combining the representative qualities of each to
craft one typical and adequate lead plaintiff group. In Johnson v. Pozen Inc.,
the court stated that “proposed Co-Lead Plaintiffs have argued persuasively
that an institution/individual Co-Lead Plaintiff structure will provide a
diversity of representation and also protect the interests of the class at class
certification in the event that either [the individual] or the Pension Fund
later leaves the action for whatever reason.”275 In Plumbers & Pipefitters
Local 51 Pension Fund v. First Bancorp., the court similarly appointed
individual and institutional co-lead plaintiffs, noting:
[W]hile the Pension Fund has the expertise to prosecute the litigation in the
manner contemplated by the PSLRA . . . the small size of its loss may diminish
its incentive to carry out that function vigorously. Also, there are special
defenses that may be raised against the Pension Fund different from those that
may be raised against [the individual co-lead plaintiff appointees].276

It is noteworthy that in both Johnson and Plumbers & Pipefitters, the leadplaintiff applicants with the largest financial interest in the relief sought by
the class happened to be individual investors, so the courts appointed
institutional co-lead plaintiffs.277 Still, the rationales discussed, particularly
273

Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Trust v. LaBranche & Co., Inc., 229 F.R.D.
395, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Other courts have determined that the interests of a proposed class will be
served best by the appointment of co-lead plaintiffs or multiple lead plaintiffs who did not move initially
as a group.”); Miller v. Ventro Corp., No. 01-CV-1287, 2001 WL 34497752, at *11–12 (N.D. Cal. Nov.
28, 2001) (appointing separate movants as co-lead plaintiffs in order to ensure adequate representation).
274
See, e.g., Nierenberg v. CKx Inc., No. 5545–CC, 2011 WL 2185614, at *1–2 (Del. Ch. May 27,
2011) (appointing a co-applicant group as lead plaintiff); In re Allion Healthcare Inc. S’holders Litig.,
No. 5022–CC, 2011 WL 1135016, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 2011) (noting appointment of competing
applicants as co-lead plaintiffs).
275
2008 WL 474334, at *3; see also In re Cable & Wireless, PLC, Sec. Litig., 217 F.R.D. 372,
375–77 (E.D. Va. 2003) (exercising discretion to appoint institution co-lead plaintiff with individual
investor because individual had purchased defendant issuer’s American Depositary Receipts on NYSE,
whereas institution could represent purchasers of defendant issuer’s common stock on London Stock
Exchange); Bell v. Ascendant Solutions, Inc., No. 3:01-CV-0166, 2002 WL 638571, at *5 (N.D. Tex.
Apr. 17, 2002) (observing that the inclusion of an institutional investor with two individual investors
helps to “improve[] diversity of experience” for the class); Laborers Local 1298 Pension Fund v.
Campbell Soup Co., No. Civ.A. 00-152 (JEI), 2000 WL 486956, at *3 (D.N.J. 2000) (“The Court also
considers it desirable to have both an institutional investor, like Connecticut, and individual investors,
like DeValle and Green, included as lead plaintiffs since each may bring a unique perspective to the
litigation.”); Yousefi v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1071 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (“The
Court also finds that with the appointment of one lead plaintiff who is an individual private investor and
one lead plaintiff that is an institutional investor, the lead plaintiffs will represent a broader range of
shareholder interests than if the Court appointed an individual or an institutional investor alone.”).
276
409 F. Supp. 2d 482, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
277
Id.; Johnson, 2008 WL 474334, at *3.
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in Plumbers & Pipefitters, fit the reverse scenario as well, with an
institution that has the largest absolute loss but one that is trivial relative to
its asset size, though it seems no court has chosen to apply this reasoning in
such a circumstance.
The procedure for selecting the individual co-lead plaintiff should
mimic that for selecting lead plaintiffs generally. A court should conduct
the lead plaintiff contest, where applicable, on two tracks. The first track
would be for the selection of the institutional lead plaintiff, the second for
selection of the individual. This sequence should be observed in order to
select an individual co-lead plaintiff who complements the institutional lead
plaintiff, not the other way around. The sequence maintains fidelity to
Congress’s preference for the selection of institutional investor lead
plaintiffs.
As to the procedure for the individual lead plaintiff selection, the court
should first establish which applicants have the largest absolute financial
interest in the relief sought by the class. The most straightforward way to
analyze this would be to determine which applicant incurred the largest loss
in the fraud after disclosure of all relevant securities. This procedure alone
would ensure an individual co-lead plaintiff with a significant stake in the
case. And it is likely that this stake relative to the individual’s net worth or
total portfolio is greater than that of the institution’s loss relative to its total
portfolio.278 Courts wishing to delve deeper should then consider the losses
of the leading individual candidates relative either to their total assets or
their total investment portfolios. The selection process need not be overly
formalistic or rigid. The court could identify the individuals with the largest
absolute losses (compared to other individuals) and look to the size of these
losses relative to the individuals’ overall portfolio or net worth.279 The
purpose of this inquiry would be to enable the court to refine its choice
among competing individual lead plaintiff applicants by determining which
of these individuals with the most substantial absolute losses have incurred
losses that are sufficiently material to motivate them to monitor class
counsel. Individuals with high relative losses can be counted on to serve as
motivated lead plaintiffs who will push their lawyers and the defendants to
maximize monetary recovery for the class280 and may well be sophisticated
enough for the job, as discussed in the survey of the financial literature
278

See e.g., In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6027-VCL, 2010 WL 5550677, at
*6–7 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2010) (selected as lead plaintiff a pension trust that owned 25,000 shares worth
$475,000 and representing 0.07% of its assets under management instead of a European asset manager
for private and institutional clients that held 1,899,900 shares worth $36 million and representing 0.02%
of its assets under management.)
279
Individuals who may be sensitive to disclosing their net worth or the size of their portfolios may
request confidential treatment of this information.
280
See generally Nicholas Barberis & Richard Thaler, Survey of Behavioral Finance, in 1
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 1053, 1067–72 (G.M. Constantinides et al. eds., 2003)
(noting the effect narrow framing has on individual preference and evaluation of utility).
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above.281 Courts could measure the applicants’ sophistication by requiring
them to submit affidavits offering some brief biographical background,
similar to what institutional investors and their lawyers currently present,282
along with their certifications attesting to the purchases. In most cases, the
individual investor should not have traded in derivatives of the stock,
should be a sell plaintiff and not a hold plaintiff, and therefore, should be
very interested in maximizing the damage payment to shareholders. At the
state transactional level, the individual should not hold stock in the bidder.
These restrictions should rule out few individuals, as they are attributes
more commonly associated with institutional investors.
Once the individual and institution are selected, the court should then
determine whether the combined lead plaintiffs comply with the Rule 23
requirements that they be typical and adequate class representatives. If the
court finds that the co-lead plaintiffs fail the test, it can drop any of the colead plaintiffs, or all of them, and begin the process again. As with the
current PSLRA procedure, once the presumptive co-lead plaintiffs are
established, other members of the plaintiff class may overcome the
presumption by demonstrating that the co-lead plaintiffs “will not fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class; or . . . [are] subject to unique
defenses that render such plaintiff incapable of adequately representing the
class.”283 The objective is for the individual investor, in looking out for her
own best interests, to be looking out for those of the individual investor
class members as well. The institutional and individual investors would
jointly select lead counsel or select their respective counsel as co-lead
counsel.
This procedure should ensure a more robust airing of the views of all
class members in lead plaintiff decisions made on their behalf. Selecting the
right individual co-lead plaintiff would improve the motivation and possibly
the sophistication of the lead plaintiff group. The right individual co-lead
plaintiff would reduce concerns about whether the lead plaintiff group is
typical and adequate.284 For derivatives trading, an individual co-lead
plaintiff would reduce concerns about hidden gains or hidden offset losses
in the lead plaintiff group. An individual who did not trade in derivatives
281

See discussion supra Part II.
See, e.g., In re Bank of America Corp. Sec., Derivative & Emp’t Ret. Income Sec. Act (ERISA)
Litig., 258 F.R.D. 260, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (referencing the high level of experience possessed by
proposed lead counsel); Se. Penn. Transp. Auth. v. Rubin, No. 6323-VCN, 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 67, at
*4 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2011) (explaining that where all lead counsel applicants “have successfully served
as lead or co-lead counsel in varying numbers of complex cases,” the applicants cannot be distinguished
and selected based on that prior experience); see also In re Molson Coors Brewing Co. Sec. Litig., 233
F.R.D. 147, 151 (D. Del. 2005) (noting that lead plaintiff applicant explained its qualifications by stating
that “[it] has been appointed lead plaintiff or co-lead plaintiff in four securities class actions, and has
never been rejected on adequacy grounds” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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could insulate an otherwise attractive lead plaintiff group from attacks on its
institutional members who might have reliance problems. Even if such
attacks are successful in disqualifying the institutional lead plaintiff, the
presence of the individual lead assures continuity of representation for the
class both in terms of the individual lead plaintiff and the lead counsel.
Conversely, to the extent that courts find that the presence of an individual,
non-derivatives-trading investor “cures” the typicality and adequacy issue
for a co-lead plaintiff group that includes a derivatives trader, this might
attract the participation of large institutional investors that might otherwise
not apply to be a lead plaintiff or might otherwise opt out and bring a
separate action because of the potential conflicts caused by its derivatives
trading. Such investors are the type Congress had in mind in adopting the
lead plaintiff provisions of the PSLRA in the first place.285
Regarding conflicts over compensation versus corporate governance
reform between holding and selling plaintiffs, the individual co-lead
plaintiff could restore the voice of selling plaintiffs into the settlement
process. Such a voice might not only improve monetary compensation for
the class but could also aid in preserving the deterrence function of the class
action. Likewise, an individual co-lead plaintiff would ensure that a
member of the lead-plaintiff group in a state-level transactional class action
has an equity stake in the target alone and not the bidder. While conflicts
created by an institutional owner of both the target and the bidder(s) could
be alleviated through disclosure of the applicants’ holdings in the bidder as
outlined in Part III.B.3 above, appointment of an unconflicted individual
co-lead creates added assurance that the interests of the lead plaintiff group
are properly aligned with the class, particularly when the presence of
multiple bidders greatly complicates the relative-stakes analysis for
institutional investors. And unlike the use of subclasses, an individual–
institutional co-lead plaintiff allows individual class members to benefit
from the sophistication and experience of the institutional lead plaintiffs
without subordinating their interests to them or exposing both subclasses to
divide-and-conquer strategies by defendants, as discussed below. In
addition, this procedure facilitates a larger role for individuals in securities
class actions without marking a return to the pre-PSLRA days, when
individual lead plaintiffs obtained the position by winning the race to the
courthouse rather than on the basis of their investment in the defendant
company. Unlike those individuals, the individuals for which this Article
advocates as co-lead plaintiffs have a genuine stake in the outcome and
every incentive to monitor class counsel.
A risk of this co-lead plaintiff approach is that the conflicts described
above could result in irreconcilable differences within the group.286
285
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Individual demands for maximum compensation could conflict with
institutions’ ongoing investments in the issuer or their desire for corporate
governance reform. In some instances, subclasses may be inevitable, as
discussed below. But there should be few such cases.
First, courts should be reluctant to create subclasses given that they
contravene Congress’s intention that institutional investors should lead the
class.287 Second, institutional investors often seek both monetary
compensation and corporate governance reform, and a restructuring of
settlements to place increased emphasis on the former should not trigger
extensive institutional resistance as long as it does not place the institutions’
ongoing investment in the issuer at risk. Because many settlements are
covered not by the corporation alone but by directors’ and officers’
insurance policies, and occasionally by contributions from underwriters and
professionals too,288 a conflict in which the institutions would actually be
opposed to monetary compensation and only willing to accept corporate
governance reform should be rare. Third, it is possible, if not likely, that the
addition of individual investor co-lead plaintiffs would not lead to a net
decrease in corporate governance reform in exchange for greater
compensation but will lead to increased compensation alongside corporate
governance reform. Individual investors are more sympathetic in the eyes of
the public than large institutional investors.289 In the rare instance in which
these cases go to trial, individual investors are often presented to the jury
because they make more sympathetic witnesses.290 Presenting such investors
before the judge, defense counsel, or the defendants may strengthen the
emotive if not the legal case for monetary compensation, giving the
defendants a preview of what the trial might be like and influencing the
primary actors in favor of additional monetary compensation. Institutional
investors are rarely positioned to make persuasive, sympathetic arguments
that they were meaningfully harmed by the fraud, if not debilitated by it;
monetary compensation arguments made by institutional investors look like
stalking horses for the “true” motive of maximizing pay for their lawyers.

through group voting, and strategic behavior through withholding consent” (citing SCOTT E. PAGE, THE
DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS AND
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And as discussed below, the creation of subclasses exposes shareholders to
divide-and-conquer exploitation by defendants. Rational shareholders
should recognize the dangers of such exposure and make every effort to
work within the co-lead plaintiff structure.
Finally, this proposed procedure offers all of the benefits enumerated
above at minimal cost to courts in terms of added workload. In fact, there
are strong reasons to believe that it will actually reduce burdens on the
court. In the most likely scenario, the additional up-front investment of
court time may be measured in minutes. Instead of reviewing a set of lead
plaintiff application papers from institutional investors alone, courts will
also review such applications from individuals. Institutional and individual
investors may even apply jointly for the co-lead plaintiff position, thereby
adding no additional briefs to the file. As with many current lead plaintiff
fights, the outcome may be decided on the briefs alone. The papers will
state the individual co-lead plaintiff applicant’s losses and provide some
background information about the applicant and the selected counsel. The
court may wish to assess these losses relative to the applicant’s total
portfolio or assets by requesting that information in advance. Lead plaintiff
application hearings, to the extent they occur, tend to last half a court day at
the most. There is no reason to believe that the procedure propounded here
will add materially to the efforts courts undertake anyway.
Moreover, co-lead plaintiffs have become increasingly prevalent in
securities and transactional class actions. For example, in a hand-collected
dataset of all 453 Delaware class and derivative actions filed from October
2003 to December 2009, 44% of all cases contained at least two co-lead
plaintiffs, nearly a quarter were led by three or more plaintiffs, and nearly
10% were led by five or more plaintiffs.291 Thirty percent of all cases led by
an institutional investor were led by more than one such investor.292 Nearly
a quarter of all cases contained at least one institutional and one individual
lead plaintiff, albeit an individual who was not selected according to the
procedure outlined here.293 In short, courts are already well-practiced in
selecting co-lead plaintiffs. Nor is there any reason to believe that cohesive
groups of multiple lead plaintiffs result in underperformance.294 In the early
years following passage of the PSLRA, plaintiffs’ lawyers attempted to
aggregate very large groups of investors (sometimes numbering in the
thousands) for purposes of meeting the largest financial interest test.295
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Some commentators expressed understandable concern that these large,
aggregated groups of lead plaintiffs would ineffectively monitor class
counsel, undermining a primary goal of the PSLRA.296 This practice of
aggregating very large numbers of lead plaintiffs into lead plaintiff groups
has all but disappeared.297 But there is little to suggest that a single lead
plaintiff is superior to a small group, especially for the types of cases
discussed here. Cox and Thomas conclude that single individual lead
plaintiffs outperform groups in “bottom-tier cases,” but that groups of
individuals outperform single individual lead plaintiffs in “top-tier cases”
(where the tiers are based on the market capitalization of the defendant).298
As I noted earlier, the conflicts presented here are particularly problematic
in top-tier cases in which it is more likely that an institutional investor will
obtain a lead plaintiff appointment.
Of course, it is true that more applications by more parties may lead to
more conflicts at the lead plaintiff selection stage. But what the court saves
in time on the back end may more than compensate for the additional upfront investment. By obtaining a more representative lead plaintiff group,
courts may substantially reduce objections to the typicality and adequacy of
the class representatives at the settlement hearing. They may also be spared
the ordeal of having to select an entirely new lead plaintiff group or new
lead counsel because the selected lead plaintiff finds itself subjected to
unique defenses.
In short, my proposal favoring appointment of individual co-lead
plaintiffs will not materially increase the burdens on courts but will instead
likely reduce that burden.
B. Subclasses of Institutional and Individual Plaintiffs
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(5) grants courts the discretion to
create subclasses, stating that “[w]hen appropriate, a class may be divided

of whom were applying for appointment as lead counsel, and another consisting of “over 100 institutions
and thousands of individuals”).
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into subclasses that are each treated as a class under this rule.”299 There is
little precedent construing the rule, and the academic commentary on it has
been sparse.300 Courts create subclasses when certain class members
“require specialized or distinct treatment,”301 whether such distinct
treatment refers to claims or remedies.302 Here, both individual and
institutional investors have largely the same interests in prevailing on
liability issues.303 Primarily, it is conflicts over remedies that set them apart.
Probably the purest way to solve these conflicts is to separate individual
and institutional investors into subclasses.
As noted above, the Cendant court suggested that subclasses may be a
way to cope with conflicts between selling and holding plaintiffs.304 This is
one small logical step away from suggesting subclasses for individual and
institutional investors, as the subclass of sell plaintiffs may be primarily
composed of individual investors, whereas the subclass of hold plaintiffs
conversely may be composed mostly of institutional investors. Still, even
Cendant shied away from appointing subclasses for selling and holding
plaintiffs on the grounds that if such a conflict were itself disqualifying, it
would undercut Congress’s intention that institutions obtain lead plaintiff
appointments.305 Without something more, the sell–hold conflict alone
failed to justify subclasses. Yet it may be the case that conflicts over
derivatives trading or corporate governance reform could tip the balance in
favor of subclasses, at least under Cendant. (The sell–hold distinction is
meaningless in the context of state-level transactional litigation, although it
bears some resemblance to the situation where the institution is invested in
both the target and the acquirer.)
The Cendant court’s reluctance to grant subclasses in the face of strong
conflicts between sell and hold plaintiffs—conflicts that were particularly
acute because the defendant issuer went bankrupt—demonstrates how
strongly courts weigh Congress’s intention that institutional investors lead
the plaintiff class.306 The co-lead plaintiff approach honors that intention
while subclasses cut against it, as they leave institutional lead plaintiffs in a
299
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position where they are only representing other institutions. Because
subclasses cut against Congress’s intent to see institutional investors
leading class actions, the burden should be high on any party seeking such a
remedy, which should only be utilized in extreme circumstances. For
example, in a case in which damages are a particularly high percentage of
the issuer’s total assets—such that even a relatively moderate rate of
recovery for investors would harm the company—and where another
conflict such as derivatives trading is present, the interests of institutional
and individual investors might diverge so greatly that they could not be
harmonized without running afoul of typicality and adequacy requirements.
Moreover, even if subclasses did not run afoul of Congress’s intention
that securities class actions be led by institutional investors, they may be a
cure worse than the disease. The sophistication of institutional investors as
lead plaintiffs is not in dispute. Their frequent access to in-house counsel;
their repeat relationships with the lead plaintiffs’ law firms; their
management of billion-dollar portfolios; their role as repeat market players;
their widespread relationships with other investors, with the companies they
invest in and with Wall Street; and their roles as fiduciaries for their
beneficiaries leave them well-placed to act as fiduciaries for the shareholder
class.307 Securities class actions featuring institutional investor lead
plaintiffs recover more for shareholders than securities class actions led by
individual investors,308 although it is difficult to discern whether this is
because the institutions are better at litigating these cases or because they
simply “cherry pick” the best ones. It may well be the case that individual
investors would fare better overall under the status quo than under a regime
in which they recover damages as part of a separate subclass of individual
investors.
The argument of this Article is that investors’ interests are optimized in
a co-lead plaintiff structure. The key from the point of view of individual
investors is to harness the benefits of an institutional lead plaintiff while
mitigating the disadvantages. Subclasses deprive individual investors of
both the advantages and disadvantages of institutional lead plaintiffs.
Moreover, because Congress expressed a preference that lead plaintiffs be
sophisticated and motivated, subclasses similarly deprive institutional
investors of the benefits of highly motivated individual investors with
307
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relatively high losses. Rule 23(b)(3) merely requires that questions of law
or fact common to the class predominate and that the class action device be
superior to individual actions, not that the claims should be uniform or that
the class action device be flawless.309 The Supreme Court has noted that
securities class actions readily satisfy the predominance standard.310
Finally, as a strategic matter, subclasses allow defendants to “divide
and conquer” the plaintiffs.311 There are numerous potential permutations of
how defendants could exploit subclasses. They could offer comparatively
generous terms to the first settling subclass while threatening to deploy
maximum litigation resources against the second. They could exploit
competition between the subclasses’ respective plaintiffs’ law firms,
consenting to higher fees for one subclass or the other. Subclasses empower
defendants to impose asymmetrical costs on competing groups of
shareholders, which invariably improves the defendants’ settlement
position. A united shareholder front presents a more daunting challenge and
will likely result in more favorable settlements for the shareholders.
Subclasses may be a cure that is more harmful than the conflicts of interest
they are designed to remedy.
Still, the conflicts addressed in this Article are serious enough that
subclasses should not be ruled out as a possible solution. Courts should be
reluctant, but not unwilling, to create them. The co-lead plaintiff structure is
preferable for the reasons outlined above. That co-lead plaintiff structure is
enhanced by the remote but real possibility that courts could impose
subclasses if necessary. The threat that either institutions or individuals
could obtain subclasses ought to keep either side (more likely institutions)
from attempting to impose their own priorities on the co-lead plaintiff group
at the expense of the other. Such an arrangement should help ensure that the
costs individuals or institutions impose on each other in negotiations over
remedies will remain lower than the costs imposed on each by subclasses.
Should either side conclude that the costs of the co-lead plaintiff
arrangement exceed that of subclasses, one would expect that a subclassing
motion would follow. The co-lead plaintiff offers an intermediate step
between the status quo and the imposition of subclasses—one that ought to
solve the typicality and adequacy problem. Courts may always resort to
subclasses if the co-lead plaintiff arrangement fails. In order to give the colead structure an opportunity to succeed, courts should be reluctant to
impose subclasses in the absence of a motion by a co-lead plaintiff calling
for this remedy in light of irreconcilable conflicts within the lead plaintiff
group.

309

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997) (“Predominance is a test readily met
in . . . cases alleging . . . securities fraud . . . .”).
311
Burch, supra note 286, at 1134 (noting risk of creating subclasses with no settlement leverage).
310

220

106:157 (2012)

The Plight of the Individual Investor

C. Should Individual Co-lead Plaintiffs Be Represented by
Separate Counsel?
A lingering question for courts will be whether the individual co-lead
plaintiffs should be represented by separate counsel or by the same counsel
as the institutional lead plaintiffs.312 Institutional investors themselves often
serve as co-lead plaintiffs in couples or groups of other institutional
investors represented by co-lead counsel; the notion of multiple lead
counsel does not depart greatly from current practice.313 Attorneys
representing both institutional and individual investor co-lead plaintiffs
would have incentives to cater to the interests of each. Because the
attorneys’ fees are based on the dollar recovery and not on corporate
governance reform, the attorneys’ incentives align well with individual
investors seeking to maximize recovery.314 But because attorneys are repeat
players and institutions have the potential to be repeat players,315 the
attorneys might prioritize institutional interests in the hope of attracting
future business or to prompt referrals to other institutions. The attorneys’
calculation would balance increased attorneys’ fees in the present case
versus the value of future institutional business and referrals. Some of this
calculation could depend on which institution(s) the attorneys happen to
represent in any given case. Among institutional investors that have
obtained lead plaintiff appointments, a substantial portion have done so just
once.316 This could be because the fund has no intention of participating
again, but was drawn to the lead-plaintiff role because of unique
circumstances pertaining to a particular case, or it could be that the fund
will become a repeat player in the future. Some funds have obtained as
many as nine appointments.317 A law firm representing the latter type of
fund might be more inclined to slant its representation towards the
312

See, e.g., Judith Resnick, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and
Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2169 (2000)
(noting that lawyers may not adequately represent the conflicting interests among different class
litigants); see also Nancy J. Moore, Ethics Matters, Too: The Significance of Professional Regulation of
Attorney Fees and Costs in Mass Tort Litigation—A Response to Judith Resnick, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
2209, 2215–23 (2000) (discussing class counsel’s ethical obligations in representing conflicted class
members); Charles Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You Choose: The Role of Plaintiffs’ Counsel in
Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84 VA. L. REV. 1465, 1483–84 (1998) (discussing the extensive role
played by class counsel in allocating settlement proceeds).
313
See Webber, supra note 96, at 2051.
314
See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 1, at 2059 (noting attorneys typically receive 20%–30% of
the monetary recovery).
315
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(vi) (2006) (allowing any plaintiff to serve as lead plaintiff no more
than five times in a three-year period).
316
See, e.g., Webber, supra note 96, at 2048, 2056 (finding that seventy-eight public pension funds
obtained lead plaintiff appointments between 2003 and 2006). In unpublished results based on the same
data used for the paper cited here, I find that just forty-three of these funds served in a lead plaintiff role
more than once.
317
Id. at 2056.

221

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

institution than would a firm representing an institution it expects will not
become a repeat player. On the other hand, a once-only institutional lead
plaintiff might incline an attorney to maximize recovery subject to the
probability that the institution could become a meaningful source of
referrals or a repeat player itself. In part, the law firm’s assessment may
depend on whether the institution in question has submitted to portfolio
monitoring by the firm.
One way to cope with attorneys serving more than one master would
be to appoint separate counsel for individual and institutional investors.
Attorneys representing the individual co-lead plaintiff would, in theory, act
based on the priorities of that plaintiff. But the underlying question remains:
what are the attorneys’ incentives? This leads to the crucial issue of how
they will be paid. If we assume that counsel for the individual co-lead
plaintiff will be compensated for its work on behalf of the individual
investors alone, then the potential recovery for such attorneys in many cases
could be too small to attract quality counsel.318 In Delaware, courts weigh
the “competence of counsel and their access to the resources necessary to
prosecute the claims at issue” in selecting lead plaintiffs in the first place,319
and federal courts similarly consider the competence of proposed lead
plaintiff’s counsel in selecting a lead plaintiff.320
Conversely, high attorneys’ fees commanded by individual investor
counsel would be removed from the pockets of institutional investor
counsel. The downside risks of separate counsel include the possibility of
either poor quality legal work for individual investors or a net increase in
attorneys’ fees paid by the class as institutional counsel demand higher
compensation to make up for fees earned by individual counsel. Arguably,
such higher fees could be worth the cost of improved representation,
particularly if it results in increased compensation for the class. However, in
general, courts will not want to see lawyers collecting an even greater share
of class recoveries than they already do.
Depending on the case, such concerns about the zero-sum nature of
attorneys’ fees may be exaggerated. The absolute value of fees in the
blockbuster cases that plaintiffs’ lawyers bring to compensate for the costs
of shepherding a portfolio of class actions through the almost-insuperable
barriers of pretrial securities litigation practice—such as the bar on
discovery prior to a ruling on the motion to dismiss and the highest pleading
318
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standard in contemporary civil procedure—may be high enough to bear
further subdivision among additional counsel without damaging anyone’s
desire to take the job.
Alternatively, individual and institutional counsel could be
compensated based upon the recovery for the class as a whole and not just
their particular clients. The difficulty here is that one might question how
separate counsel would add value if they will be responding to the same
incentives as the institutional counsel, balancing recovery in the current
action against the potential to attract institutional clients in a future action.
Ultimately, the factors outlined above—the proportional share of
individual investor damages, the incentives of institutional counsel in any
particular case, and the total dollar size of the potential recovery—are case
specific and best known to the trial judge. Rather than impose a one-sizefits-all solution, trial court judges should exercise their discretion in
deciding whether to appoint separate counsel for the individual co-lead
plaintiff.321
CONCLUSION
Judges in securities and transactional class actions must balance two
vital commands: appointment of an institutional investor lead plaintiff—the
purpose of the “largest financial interest” provision of the PSLRA and the
practice followed in Delaware—and appointment of a typical and adequate
class representative as required by Rule 23.322 Although these commands
have been portrayed as being in concert with one another, this Article
argues that they frequently conflict. Institutional investors’ derivatives
trading, their practice of retaining equity in the defendant company even
after the fraud has been exposed, their use of litigation to pursue corporate
governance reforms, and, in state-level transactional cases, their
maintenance of equity in both target and bidder companies create incentives
that at times diverge from those of individual investor class members. In
many instances, appointment of institutional lead plaintiffs strains Rule 23
requirements that a lead plaintiff be both a typical and adequate class
representative.
While the status quo is unsatisfactory from the perspective of
individual shareholders, total elimination of these conflicts by dividing
321
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shareholders into subclasses of institutional and individual plaintiffs would
contravene the intent of the PSLRA, deprive individual investors of the
benefits of institutional lead plaintiffs, and allow defendants to “divide and
conquer” plaintiff shareholders. The sensible course for vindicating
individual investor rights is for courts to appoint a sophisticated and
motivated individual investor to serve as co-lead plaintiff with institutional
investors. Courts should select such plaintiffs based on their financial
interest in a case, similar to the way institutional lead plaintiffs are selected
now. An individual co-lead plaintiff would be a voice for individual class
members, not to disrupt corporate governance reforms or other settlementworthy objectives, but to remind institutions and the court that for some
class members the only remedy for their injuries is money.
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